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1 
ATTEMPTS TOWARDS A ZERO-SUM GAME: A 
RECURRING IMBALANCE BETWEEN 
INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY AND THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT 
Christopher N. Netniss* 
The digital era we live in today allows society to work, shop, socialize, 
and even monitor one’s health without having to leave the confines of one’s 
home.  In a recent landmark privacy case, Carpenter v. United States, the 
individual privacy implications of the Fourth Amendment were strengthened 
when the Supreme Court held that the government must generally obtain a 
warrant before collecting more than six days of historical cell-site location 
information from a third-party service provider, like Verizon.  Cell-site lo-
cation information could implicate numerous Fourth Amendment concepts, 
such as the third-party doctrine, mosaic theory, and public exposure doctrine.  
Refusing to apply the third-party doctrine in its existing state, the Supreme 
Court advanced an alternative digital third-party doctrine to protect historical 
cell-site location information. 
Recognizing the technological advances and the ubiquitous use of tech-
nology by society, the Court’s decision attempts to balance the playing field 
between individual privacy and law enforcement.  This Article explores the 
Supreme Court’s selective valuation of privacy in physical and digital infor-
mation.  In doing so, this Article argues that a digital third-party doctrine will 
not resolve the tension between the Fourth Amendment and technology, as 
it is a direct departure from traditional expectations and proves unworkable.  
What will prove workable, however, is adhering to the common understand-
ing that what enters the public—either through physical or digital infor-
mation—remains public knowledge, and that which is public knowledge 
does not amount to a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2020, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.  The author would like to first 
thank his parents for their unconditional love and endless wisdom.  The author would also like to 
thank his advisor, Professor Marcy Strauss, whose insight and feedback improved this piece im-
measurably, and his student Note advisors for providing feedback and encouragement no matter 
the time of day.  Finally, the author would like to express his gratitude to his team at the Loyola of 
Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review for the honor of working with them. 
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How much are you willing to give up for your privacy?  Are you 
willing to forego social media?  Are you willing to limit your 
conversations with family and friends to in-person only?  Are you 
willing to operate your own personal banking system at home 
instead of using a conventional banking method?  Are you willing 
to disconnect your cell phone each time you travel outside the 
confines of your home?  Are you willing to physically travel to a 
convenience store to inquire about a product instead of using your 
electronics to browse their website online? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine having the sudden urge to watch a baseball game at Dodger 
Stadium in Los Angeles, California.  Using your cell phone, you start re-
searching when the next Dodger game is.  You find out the Dodgers have a 
home game that night, so you scour the Internet for tickets, visiting site after 
site for the best bargain.  You end up finding the right seat at the right price, 
prompting you to pull out your banking debit card to finalize the purchase.  
An e-mail confirmation is then sent to you, and you begin making your way 
to Dodger Stadium.  Along the way, you get hungry.  You stop at a local 
restaurant, purchase food with your debit card, then continue on your way to 
the stadium.  You get to the stadium, and in order to enter the stadium, you 
show security the e-mail confirmation from your phone.  Once inside the 
stadium, you purchase drinks and a Dodger hat using your debit card.  Ex-
cited, you share photos of yourself at the stadium on Facebook.  After the 
game, you use a navigational app on your phone, Waze, to help get you home 
faster.  Finally, you arrive home, satisfied that you acted on your idea to 
watch a baseball game.  Unfortunately for you, what began as an idea in 
attending a baseball game is now a lasting digital trail of your physical 
whereabouts.  And until recently, you lacked an expectation of privacy in 
your personal information that law enforcement wants to collect from your 
journey to Dodger Stadium.  That may have changed in Carpenter v. United 
States (“Carpenter”).1 
In Carpenter, a recent landmark privacy case, the individual privacy 
implications of the Fourth Amendment were strengthened when the United 
States Supreme Court held that the government must generally obtain a war-
rant in order to collect historical cell-site location information (CSLI) from 
 
1.  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).  
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a third-party service provider.2  Using the example above, each time the 
Dodger fan’s cell phone was near a cell tower, a signal would transmit to the 
cell tower generating an approximate location of the cell phone, and the lo-
cation history of the cell phone would then be documented and stored by a 
third-party service provider.3  If, a week later, law enforcement approaches 
Verizon, a third-party service provider, with a subpoena requesting the loca-
tion information generated by the Dodger fan’s cell phone, the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Carpenter may give the Dodger fan a legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy in the location information that was generated.4  The same 
could not be said if law enforcement went to the Dodger fan’s bank with a 
subpoena and requested the fan’s bank records, detailing the fan’s transac-
tional history.5  While the fan may have a privacy interest in the location 
information generated by the cell towers, the fan has no privacy interest in 
the bank records.6 
The Fourth Amendment,7 originally enacted to protect against trespass 
in the home by law enforcement, today also safeguards digital data from be-
ing obtained by law enforcement.  The market for technology and the “seis-
mic shifts in digital technology” cause a recurring imbalance between indi-
vidual privacy and the Fourth Amendment.8  This Article explores the 
privacy implications of both digital data and physical information, and ex-
plains the similarities and differences of the privacy interests between the 
 
2. Id. at 2221 (holding that “the Government must generally obtain a warrant supported by 
probable cause before acquiring” historical cell-site location information from third-party provid-
ers).  
3. See, e.g., State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 636–37 (N.J. 2013) (explaining how cell-site loca-
tion information is generated).  
4. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221 (holding that “the Government must generally obtain a 
warrant supported by probable cause before acquiring” historical cell-site location information 
from third party providers).  
5. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 444 (1976) (holding that “the issuance of a sub-
poena to a third party to obtain the records of that party does not violate the rights” of an individual).  
6. Id.; Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221.  
7. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
8. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219.  
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two.  In doing so, this Article explores numerous Fourth Amendment con-
cepts such as the third-party doctrine (TPD), the mosaic theory, and the pub-
lic exposure doctrine (PED). 
Part II of this Article describes the legal background of the Fourth 
Amendment and the background from which Carpenter draws its authority.  
Part III examines the Carpenter decision.  Part IV explains the implications 
of obtaining digital data and physical information, and why the third-party 
doctrine proves unworkable, especially considering that today’s physical in-
formation is increasingly digitized.  Part V discusses the impracticability of 
factoring length of surveillance into the reasonable expectations of privacy 
analysis.  Finally, Part VI concludes this Article by advocating that both the 
third-party doctrine and the mosaic theory should be rejected, while adhering 
to the common understanding that public knowledge does not amount to a 
legitimate expectation of privacy when it enters the public eye. 
II. BACKGROUND OF THE LEGAL STANDARD 
The ratification of the Fourth Amendment was a direct departure from 
the once-utilized “Writs of Assistance.”9  These general, non-specific war-
rants had arbitrary roots, which carved the path for the Fourth Amendment.10  
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence protects individuals from being subject to 
an unreasonable search or seizure by the government.11  As the first clause 
of the Fourth Amendment guards against “unreasonable” searches or sei-
zures, reasonableness has been coined the “fundamental command” of the 
Fourth Amendment.12  This “imprecise and flexible term” reflects the fram-
ers’ recognition “that searches and seizures were too valuable to law enforce-
ment to prohibit them entirely,” and instead “should be slowed down.”13  
 
9. James Otis, Against Writs of Assistance, CONST. SOC’Y (Feb. 24, 1761), 
https://www.constitution.org/bor/otis_against_writs.htm [https://perma.cc/PQG2-W4Z5].  
10. See, e.g., Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481–82 (1965) (expressing that “the Fourth 
Amendment was most immediately the product of contemporary revulsion against a regime of writs 
of assistance . . . .”).  
11. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  The Fourth Amendment’s plain text affords “[t]he right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures,” such that “no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”  
12. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985).  
13. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 75 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting).  
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While the expectations of society helped create the Fourth Amendment, the 
expectations of society continues, for better or worse, to alter the protections 
of the Fourth Amendment.  Today’s example is the booming nature of tech-
nology. 
A. Search: Differentiating Between its Conventional and 
Constitutional Use 
Before delving into the many legal canons that are connected to the 
Fourth Amendment, it is important to differentiate between a Fourth Amend-
ment “search,” and the conventional everyday use of the word.  While we all 
may have searched the couch for our misplaced car keys, the remote to the 
television, or even a shoe that our dog might have hidden, a Fourth Amend-
ment “search” has a different meaning.14 
A modern Fourth Amendment “search” is driven by two separate 
tests—both of which—individuals can assert.  The first is the common-law 
trespass test invoked in United States v. Jones (“Jones”), which guards 
against the warrantless and physical intrusion of private property by law en-
forcement “for the purpose of obtaining information.”15  The second test, 
which this Article primarily focuses on, was invoked in Katz v. United States 
(“Katz”).16  In Katz, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of an 
electronic listening and recording device attached to a public telephone booth 
by the government without a warrant.17  Both Katz and the government ar-
gued the constitutionality of the public telephone booth in terms of a property 
interest,18 but the Court was instead concerned with individual privacy.19  
The government argued that Katz entered a public telephone booth that was 
 
14. See generally Thomas K. Clancy, The Framers’ Intent: John Adams, His Era, and the 
Fourth Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 979 (2011) (explaining the structure and evolution of the Fourth 
Amendment).  
15. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–05 (2012) (holding that “the Government’s 
installation of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s 
movements, constitutes a ‘search.’”). 
16. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); Jones, 565 
U.S. at 408–09 (“[T]he Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substi-
tuted for, the common-law trespassory test.”).  
17. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348, 354–56.  
18. Id. at 351.  
19. Id. at 351–52.  
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constructed out of glass, allowing any passerby, including a government of-
ficial, to observe Katz.20  The Court agreed with the government insofar as 
“[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or 
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”21  But the Court 
disagreed that this rule is absolute.22  The Court explained that when Katz 
entered the public telephone booth, closed the door behind him, paid the 
price to make a phone call, and only spoke loud enough for the recipient of 
the call to hear him, Katz sought to exclude the “uninvited ear,” not the “in-
truding eye.”23  For this reason, Katz had an expectation that “the words he 
utters” would remain private,24 and because the government did not obtain a 
warrant prior to recording Katz’ conversation,25 the government violated 
Katz’ Fourth Amendment privacy right.26  As Katz successfully did, individ-
uals can invoke the protections of the Fourth Amendment by demonstrating 
an “actual (subjective) expectation of privacy” that society recognizes as rea-
sonable.27  This two-part test encompasses a subjective and objective prong, 
but courts tend to place much more weight on the objective prong.28  The 
Supreme Court has emphasized that the reasonable expectations of privacy 
 
20. Id. at 352.  
21. Id. at 351.  
22. See, e.g., id. at 352 (explaining that Katz “did not shed his right to [privacy] . . . simply 
because he made his calls from a place where he might be seen.”).  
23. See id. at 352.  
24. Id. (noting that Katz had an expectation “that the words he utters into the mouthpiece 
will not be broadcast to the world.”); id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).  
25. Id. at 354–57 (majority opinion); id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).  
26. Id. at 358–59 (majority opinion). 
27. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurrence).  
28. See generally Orin S. Kerr, Katz Only Has One Step: The Irrelevance of Subjective 
Expectations, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 113 (2015) (statistically analyzing how a large majority of courts 
consider and decide cases with little-to-no assessment of the subjective prong); see also Orin S. 
Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1037 (2010) [here-
inafter Fourth Amendment & the Internet] (expressing that “the phrase ‘reasonable expectation of 
privacy’ is essentially a legal fiction that masks a normative inquiry into whether a particular law 
enforcement technique should be regulated by the Fourth Amendment.”).  
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test asserted in Katz is subject to certain exceptions, like the third-party doc-
trine and the public exposure doctrine.29 
B. Third-Party Doctrine (TPD): Traditional Rule 
The third-party doctrine originated in United States v. Miller30 and was 
reinforced in Smith v. Maryland,31 where the Supreme Court established that 
individuals lack any legitimate expectation of privacy in information volun-
tarily disclosed to third parties.32  For example, suppose Will enters a bank, 
creates an account, and later makes purchases using a debit card that was 
issued to him from his bank.  In this example, the bank is the third party, and 
all of Will’s transactions serve as information that Will voluntarily shares 
with the bank.  If the government sought to obtain a hard copy of Will’s 
transactional history from the bank, Will has no privacy interest in those 
bank records despite the records being a summary of when, where, and how 
Will used his money.  The reason for Will’s lack of privacy interest is simple, 
yet difficult to accept.  When individuals voluntarily convey information to 
third parties, it is presumed that they assume the risk that the third party will 
then disclose that information to the government.33  Even if an individual is 
unaware that his information is being documented and stored by a third party, 
the application of the traditional third-party doctrine does not change be-
cause the traditional rule does not cater to the “least-sophisticated” con-
sumer.34  Although the presumption that individuals assume the risk remains 
 
29. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasizing the two-prong privacy 
test is “subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”).  
30. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216 (2018) (explaining that the “third 
party doctrine largely traces its roots to” United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)).  
31. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742–44 (1979).  
32. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–43 (1976).  For a detailed analysis of the 
third-party doctrine, see generally Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. 
L. REV. 561 (2009) [hereinafter Third-Party Doctrine] (exploring the third-party doctrine).  
33. Miller, 425 U.S. at 443; see also Smith, 442 U.S. at 745.  
34. United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 887 (6th Cir. 2016); see Smith, 442 U.S. at 
742; see also Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 (emphasizing that the lack of privacy interest remains true 
“even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited pur-
pose.”).  
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true under the traditional third-party doctrine,35 there are circumstances 
where courts do assess the content of information. 
1. Content Information Versus Non-Content Information 
When analyzing the third-party doctrine, courts often assess whether 
the information voluntarily shared contains content information or non-con-
tent information.36  Content information is the actual “contents of communi-
cations,”37 such as the typed message in an email or text message,38 or the 
written message on a letter that is sealed inside an envelope.39  These type of 
communications often reveal an individual’s personal and private thoughts.40  
The Supreme Court and its progeny have held that individuals have an ex-
pectation of privacy in content information—and as a result, the government 
must generally obtain a warrant supported by probable cause in order to ob-
tain content information.41  Non-content information, however, is the out-
 
35. Miller, 425 U.S. at 443; see also Smith, 442 U.S. at 745.  
36. See generally Fourth Amendment & the Internet, supra note 28 (explaining the distinc-
tion between content information and non-content information, and how courts assess the two).  
37. Smith, 442 U.S. at 741.  
38. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that individuals 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of their emails); City of Ontario v. Quon, 
560 U.S. 746, 754–55 (2010) (discussing the expectations of privacy in the content of text mes-
sages).  
39. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878) (holding that “[l]etters and sealed packages 
of this kind in the mail are as fully guarded from examination and inspection, except as to their 
outward form and weight, as if they were retained by the parties forwarding them in their own 
domiciles.”).  
40. Fourth Amendment & the Internet, supra note 28, at 1020–22.  
41. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. at 733 (“The constitutional guaranty of the right of the people 
to be secure in their papers against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their papers, thus 
closed against inspection, wherever they may be.  Whilst in the mail, they can only be opened and 
examined under like warrant, issued upon similar oath or affirmation, particularly describing the 
thing to be seized, as is required when papers are subjected to search in one’s own household.”); 
see also Warshak, 631 F.3d at 288 (holding that individuals have a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in the content of their emails). 
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ward information necessary to establish communication, such as a recipi-
ent’s address on an envelope.42  Because non-content information is infor-
mation that is shared with third parties, like the postal office when a letter is 
mailed, the government does not need a warrant supported by probable cause 
to obtain the non-content information contained on the envelope.43 
Courts have also analyzed content information and non-content infor-
mation in e-mail communications.44  Although lower courts have instructed 
that the actual content of e-mail communications is protected,45 the Supreme 
Court has made clear that digital communication is not completely immune 
from being obtained and read without a warrant.46  At the same time, if the 
same communication is written on paper, placed in an envelope, sealed, and 
placed in the mail for delivery, then the letter carries with it the full protec-
tion of the Fourth Amendment.47  The implications of digital and physical 
information lead to a recurring issue: different forms of communication carry 
different constitutional protections despite containing the same information. 
 
42. See, e.g., Smith, 442 U.S. at 741 (explaining that a pen register does not reveal the 
content of a phone call, but the phone numbers dialed as “a means of establishing communica-
tion.”); see also Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. at 733 (holding that “[l]etters and sealed packages of 
this kind in the mail are as fully guarded from examination and inspection, except as to their out-
ward form and weight, as if they were retained by the parties forwarding them in their own domi-
ciles.”).  
43. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 741.  
44. See, e.g., Warshak, 631 F.3d at 285–88.  
45. See, e.g., Warshak, 631 F.3d at 288 (holding that individuals have a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in the content of their emails).  
46. See City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 762 (2010) (emphasizing that “[e]ven if he 
could assume some level of privacy would inhere in his messages, it would not have been reason-
able for Quon to conclude that his messages were in all circumstances immune from scrutiny.”).  
47. E.g., Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. at 733 (“Whilst in the mail, they can only be opened 
and examined under like warrant, issued upon similar oath or affirmation, particularly describing 
the thing to be seized, as is required when papers are subjected to search in one’s own household.”).  
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C. Public Exposure Doctrine 
The public exposure doctrine is fairly intuitive: what an individual ex-
poses to the public, he lacks an expectation of privacy in.48  This rule is not 
absolute, as not every public exposure vitiates Fourth Amendment protec-
tion.49  A prime example is the central telephone booth case, Katz v. United 
States, where the Supreme Court recognized the expectations of privacy 
when individuals are in public.50  Although the Court emphasized that “ob-
jects, activities, or statements that [a person] exposes to the ‘plain view’ of 
outsiders” do not receive Fourth Amendment protection,51  the Court coun-
teractively noted that “what [one] seeks to preserve as private, even in an 
area accessible to the public, may [still] be constitutionally protected.”52  
While in public, Katz stepped inside a public telephone booth, closed the 
door behind him, paid the fee to make a call, and began communicating.53  
Left with analyzing the constitutional protection of public observation, the 
Court expressed that it was not the “intruding eye”54 that warranted an ex-
pectation of privacy for Katz; it was the “uninvited ear.”55  Katz’ deliberate 
attempt to keep his phone call private meant that Katz had an expectation 
“that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the 
world,” and this expectation is one that society agreed with.56 
 
48. E.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983) (“A person traveling in an 
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements 
from one place to another.”).  
49. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–52 (1967) (explaining that “what a person 
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally pro-
tected.”).  
50. Id. at 350–51.  
51. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).  
52. Id. at 351–52 (majority opinion).  
53. Id. at 352 (“One who occupies it, shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that 
permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece 
will not be broadcast to the world.”); id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).  
54. Id. at 352 (majority opinion).  
55. Id.  
56. Id. 
NETNISS (DO NOT DELETE) 12/4/19  11:11 AM 
2019] ATTEMPTS TOWARDS A ZERO-SUM GAME 11 
Vehicles are also subject to the public exposure doctrine.57  When ve-
hicles are “thrust[ed] into the public eye,”58 on first impression, the public 
exposure doctrine leads us to believe that simply observing the vehicle is not 
a Fourth Amendment search.59  But this is not always true.  One example 
stems from “longer term” monitoring by law enforcement.60  Regardless if a 
vehicle is “disclosed to the public at large,”61 depending on how long law 
enforcement officials observe the vehicle, they could violate the Fourth 
Amendment.62 
1. Length of Surveillance 
The Supreme Court has underscored the point that society does not ex-
pect that law enforcement would (or could) expend the time, resources, and 
money to monitor and catalogue every detail about an individual for long 
periods of time.63  The Supreme Court has also expressed concern that 
lengthy surveillance has the capability of revealing an abundance of personal 
information about an individual.64  Revealing large quantities of personal in-
formation is not what society expects to volunteer to the general public when 
traveling in public.65  As Justice Ginsburg put it: 
 
57. See, e.g., New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 114 (1986); United States v. Knotts, 460 
U.S. 276, 281 (1983); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 412 (2012).  
58. Class, 475 U.S at 114.  
59. See, e.g., Class, 475 U.S at 114 (referring to a vehicle, “to examine it does not constitute 
a [Fourth Amendment] search.”).  
60. Jones, 565 U.S. at 415 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 430 (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring).  
61. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2215 (2018); see Jones, 565 U.S. at 415 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring); see also id. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment).  
62. See, e.g., Jones, 565 U.S. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 430 (Alito, J., con-
curring in judgment).  
63. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring in 
judgement) (“[S]ociety’s expectation has been that law enforcement agents and others would not—
and indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement 
of an individual’s car for a very long period.”)).  
64. See, e.g., Jones, 565 U.S. at 415–16 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
65. Id. at 416; id. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment).  
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The whole of one’s movements over the course of a month is not 
constructively exposed to the public because, like a rap sheet, that 
whole reveals far more than the individual movements it 
comprises. The difference is not one of degree but of kind, for no 
single journey reveals the habits and patterns that mark the 
distinction between a day in the life and a way of life.66 
The aggregation of this information creates a “mosaic.”67  The so-called 
mosaic theory is “premised on aggregation: it considers whether a set of non-
searches aggregated together amount to a search because their collection and 
subsequent analysis creates a revealing mosaic.”68  The Supreme Court ex-
plains that analyzing information in the aggregate has the potential to reveal 
“the sum of one’s public movements” that could not be reasonably discov-
erable by the general public.69  In other words, what the public observes in a 
short length of time does not compare to the revealing nature of a longer 
observation by law enforcement.70 
For example, if Bella goes to the grocery store on Monday, the public 
may observe the streets Bella drives on, the route Bella takes to the grocery 
store, the name of the grocery store, and perhaps the address of Bella’s home.  
Now suppose law enforcement followed Bella for seven days straight.  Law 
enforcement could observe much more information concerning: (1) where 
Bella shops; (2) where Bella works; (3) where Bella eats; (4) what Bella does 
on the weekends; and (5) who Bella associates with. Narrowing in on “ag-
gregation,” it follows that any particular investigation could run afoul of the 
 
66. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 561–62 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  
67. See generally David E. Pozen, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom 
of Information Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628 (2005) (noting that the term “mosaic,” is a “borrowed [term] 
from national security law.”).  
68. See generally Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. 
L. REV. 311 (2012) (explaining the implications of the mosaic theory).  
69. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
70. See, e.g., Gabriel R. Schlabach, Privacy in The Cloud: The Mosaic Theory and the 
Stored Communications Act, 67 STAN. L. REV. 677, 678–79 (2015) (explaining that “[u]nder this 
theory, certain types of long-term (or otherwise expansive) surveillance violate a suspect’s reason-
able expectation of privacy, even when each individual act of surveillance would otherwise pass 
Fourth Amendment muster, because the government can analyze the information in the aggregate 
to infer private details about the suspect that no individual member of the public could reasonably 
discover by observing her for a short time.”).  
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Fourth Amendment depending on the length of surveillance.71  One wonders, 
how long is too long?72  And how much information is too much infor-
mation? To date, the Supreme Court has yet to establish an exact demarca-
tion line separating long term surveillance from short term surveillance.73  
Still, the Court continues to exploit the duration of law enforcement surveil-
lance, including the technology used by law enforcement when surveilling. 
2. Technology Employed by Law Enforcement 
The means by which law enforcement obtains information from indi-
viduals continues to, and perhaps for good reason, face scrutiny by the Su-
preme Court.74  Depending on the cost, ease, and efficiency of obtaining in-
formation, law enforcement could run afoul of the Fourth Amendment.75  But 
how can cost, difficulty, and efficiency influence the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion?76  One reason offered is that the methods by which law enforcement 
 
71. See Kerr, supra note 68, at 343–49 (advocating that “courts should reject the mosaic 
theory.”).  
72. Orin S. Kerr, When Does a Carpenter Search Start—and When Does It Stop?, 
LAWFARE (July 6, 2018, 10:24 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/when-does-carpenter-search-
start-and-when-does-it-stop [https://perma.cc/63QN-KBDF].  
73. See, e.g., Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment) (“We need not 
identify with precision the point at which the tracking of this vehicle became a search, for the line 
was surely crossed before the 4-week mark.”).  
74. See, e.g., id. at 415–16 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citation omitted) (arguing that “be-
cause GPS monitoring is cheap in comparison to conventional surveillance techniques and, by de-
sign, proceeds surreptitiously, it evades the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law enforcement 
practices: ‘limited police resources and community hostility.’”); see also United States v. Maynard, 
615 F.3d 544, 566 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (explaining that “when it comes to the Fourth Amendment, 
means do matter.”).  
75. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217–18 (2018) (explaining that “cell 
phone tracking is remarkably easy, cheap, and efficient compared to traditional investigative 
tools.”).  
76. See, e.g., id. at 2266 (Gorsuch, J., dissent) (“At what point does access to electronic 
data amount to ‘arbitrary’ authority? When does police surveillance become ‘too permeating’? And 
what sort of ‘obstacles’ should judges ‘place’ in law enforcement’s path when it does? We simply 
do not know.”).  
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obtains information could disrupt the balance of societal expectations to-
wards law enforcement’s authority.77  Another reason is that society does not 
expect that difficult, elaborate, and costly techniques will be employed by 
law enforcement in order to gather information on individuals.78  Indeed, as 
more and more law enforcement agencies are using technology to track the 
physical whereabouts of individuals, there is a need to balance the playing 
field between what society expects and how law enforcement obtains infor-
mation on society.79  As one commentator points out, “[t]he law intentionally 
limits the scope of police power to limit the government’s capacity for abu-
sive practices.”80  This, perhaps, explains the Supreme Court’s constant need 
to strike “a certain balance between government power and individual 
rights.”81 
 
77. See, e.g., Jones, 565 U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citation omitted) (explain-
ing that “the government’s unrestrained power to assemble data that reveal private aspects of iden-
tity is susceptible to abuse . . . [and] may ‘alter the relationship between citizen and government in 
a way that is inimical to democratic society.’”).  
78. Id. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment) (“‘[S]ociety’s expectation has been that 
law enforcement agents and others would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly 
monitor and catalogue every single movement of an individual’s car for a very long period.’”).  
79. See, e.g., When Does a Carpenter Search Start—and When Does It Stop?, supra note 
72 (explaining that because technology has made law enforcement’s access to cell-site location 
information “easy and potentially very common, the law needs to step in and make that surveillance 
difficult and rare again.”).  
80. Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of The Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. 
L. REV. 476, 485 (2011) [hereinafter Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory].  
81. Id. at 485–86 (explaining that “[i]f both the law and police practice remain constant, 
the use of new tools to commit crimes will let wrongdoers commit more crimes and will corre-
spondingly diminish police power to stop them.  Of course, the police use new tools, too.  For the 
police trying to solve crimes, new tools mean new ways to solve crimes. If the police use those new 
tools - and if the law allows the use of the new tools more readily than traditional methods to 
investigate the same offense - the new tools can expand government power by letting the govern-
ment collect more information more easily than before.”).  
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III. THE CARPENTER DECISION 
After a slew of RadioShack and T-Mobile robberies in 2011,82 prose-
cutors obtained two court orders under the Stored Communications Act,83 
compelling cellular telephone service providers MetroPCS and Sprint to turn 
over historical cell-site location information of Timothy Carpenter.84  Unlike 
a search warrant which requires probable cause, the Stored Communications 
Act allows the government to compel the disclosure of certain telecommu-
nications records when law enforcement shows reasonable grounds for be-
lieving that the records are “relevant and material to an ongoing criminal 
investigation.”85  This standard is substantially lower than the probable cause 
standard required of a warrant.86  The cell-site records revealed that “Car-
penter’s phone was near” most of the robbery sites “‘at the exact time’” the 
robberies took place.87  Carpenter argued that the government violated the 
Fourth Amendment by obtaining the cell-site records without a search war-
rant supported by probable cause.88  Despite contesting the means in which 
law enforcement obtained the cell-site location information, Carpenter was 
convicted.89 
 
82. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212 (2018).  
83. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012). For a thorough analysis of the Stored Communications 
Act, see generally Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legisla-
ture’s Guide to Amending it, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208 (2004).  
84. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212 (One order sought MetroPCS records for 152 days of 
calls but yielded records spanning 127 days.  The second order requested seven days of Sprint 
records but yielded data for two days.  Together, the data provided prosecutors with “12,898 loca-
tion points cataloging Carpenter’s movements—an average of 101 data points per day.”).  
85. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).  
86. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221.  
87. Id. at 2213 (citation omitted).  
88. Id. at 2212.  
89. Id. at 2212–13.  
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A. The Sixth Circuit Court’s Ruling 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals relied heavily on the tra-
ditional third-party doctrine in upholding Carpenter’s conviction.90  The 
court analyzed whether individuals assume the risk that their location history 
will be recorded and maintained.  In doing so, the court emphasized that “any 
cellphone user who has seen her phone’s signal strength fluctuate must know 
that, when she places or receives a call, her phone ‘exposes’ its location to 
the nearest cell tower and thus to the company that operates the tower.”91  
Moreover, “any cellphone user who has paid ‘roaming’ (i.e., out-of-network) 
charges—or even cellphone users who have not— should know that wireless 
carriers have ‘facilities for recording’ locational information and that ‘the 
phone company does in fact record this information for a variety of legiti-
mate business purposes.’”92  The court refused to accept that the “least-so-
phisticated phone user”93 may not know that their location information was 
being monitored, and instead re-affirmed the presumption that individuals 
assume such risks accompanied with sharing information with third parties.94 
The court also distinguished between content information and non-con-
tent information, and explained that while “the content of personal commu-
nications is private, the information necessary to get those communications 
from point A to point B is not.”95  Cell-site data, according to the Sixth Cir-
cuit, is akin to the mailing addresses “that facilitate personal communica-
tions, rather than part of the content of those communications themselves.”96  
Thus, the cell-site data in Carpenter concerned only non-content infor-
mation, which did not require the government to obtain a warrant supported 
 
90. United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 886–90 (6th Cir. 2016).  
91. Id. at 888.  
92. Id. (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741–43 (1979)).  
93. Id. at 887.  
94. Id. at 887–88.  
95. Id. at 886.  
96. Id. at 887. 
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by probable cause because individuals have no privacy interest in non-con-
tent information.97 
The Sixth Circuit also weighed in on the level of precision that cell-site 
location data reveals.98  In doing so, the court distinguished cell-site data 
from data collected by a global positioning system (GPS).99  The court em-
phasized that cell-site location information reveals an inexact location 
“within a 3.5 million square-foot to 100 million square-foot area—as much 
as 12,500 times less accurate” than GPS devices which “are accurate within 
about 50 feet.”100  Based on the increased level of accuracy that GPS data 
produces, GPS data can reveal precise details about an individual that could 
not be revealed by cell-site data.101  As a result, the government’s warrantless 
collection of historical cell-site data under the Stored Communications Act 
was permissible. 
B. The United States Supreme Court’s Ruling 
On review, the United States Supreme Court, in a narrow 5-4 decision, 
held that the government’s acquisition of historical cell-site location infor-
mation was a Fourth Amendment search under Katz’ reasonable expectation 
of privacy test.102  Beginning with the Stored Communications Act, the Court 
refused to accept that law enforcement could obtain seven days’ worth of 
historical cell-site location information using a court order under the Stored 
 
97. Id. at 887–88 (explaining that cell-site location records “fall on the unprotected side of 
this line . . . [because] [t]hose records say nothing about the content of any calls. Instead the records 
include routing information.”).  
98. Id. at 889.  
99. Id. (emphasizing that “the locational data here are accurate within a 3.5 million square-
foot to 100 million square-foot area—as much as 12,500 times less accurate than the GPS data 
in Jones.”).  
100. Id. (“[Cell-site] data could do no better than locate the defendants’ cellphones within 
a 120- (or sometimes 60-) degree radial wedge extending between one-half mile and two miles in 
length.  Which is to say the locational data here are accurate within a 3.5 million square-foot to 100 
million square-foot area—as much as 12,500 times less accurate than the GPS data in Jones.”).  
101. Id. at 886–90 (citation omitted) (explaining that unlike GPS data which “might tell a 
story of trips to ‘the strip club, the criminal defense attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the union 
meeting, the mosque, synagogue or church, the gay bar and on and on,’ cell-site data cannot tell 
that story.”).  
102. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217–19 (2018).  
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Communications Act.103  Instead, to obtain this information, the government 
must generally obtain a warrant.104 
Next, the Court strengthened its stance on privacy by reaffirming the 
need to scale back law enforcement’s ease in obtaining information on the 
public.105  Obtaining cell-site location information, in the eyes of the Court, 
“is remarkably easy . . . and efficient” for law enforcement—and provides 
law enforcement with archived information about an individual “at practi-
cally no expense.”106  The Court explained that society does not expect to 
reveal a historical database to the world when venturing out in public, as 
opposed to exposing the single-day observances to public goers.107  Thus, the 
government’s acquisition of Carpenter’s historical cell-site location infor-
mation “invaded Carpenter’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole 
of his physical movements.”108 
Finally, the Court expressly rejected the viability of the third-party doc-
trine’s use as applied to historical cell-site location information for at least 
two reasons.  First, cell-site data is both qualitatively and quantitatively dif-
 
103. Id. at 2221–23 (“While police must get a warrant when collecting CSLI to assist in the 
mine-run criminal investigation, the rule we set forth does not limit their ability to respond to an 
ongoing emergency.”).  
104. Id. at 2221 (“Before compelling a wireless carrier to turn over a subscriber’s CSLI, 
the Government’s obligation is a familiar one—get a warrant.”).  
105. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) (addressing the common us-
age of thermal imaging technology, while emphasizing that “all details [in the home] are intimate 
details, because the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes.”); United States v. Jones, 
565 U.S. 400, 403 (2012) (addressing the unconstitutionality of law enforcement attaching a GPS 
on a vehicle and monitoring it for twenty-eight days); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385–86 
(2014) (addressing the ubiquity of cell phones and the vast quantity of data stored therein); Car-
penter, 138 S. Ct. at 2206 (addressing the digital data stored by cell service providers from users’ 
cell phones pinging to cell-site towers throughout their locale).  
106. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217–18 (“And like GPS monitoring, cell phone tracking is 
remarkably easy, cheap, and efficient compared to traditional investigative tools. With just the click 
of a button, the Government can access each carrier’s deep repository of historical location infor-
mation at practically no expense.”).  
107. See id. (holding that “society’s expectation has been that law enforcement agents and 
others would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly monitor and catalogue every 
single movement of an individual’s car for a very long period.”).  
108. Id. at 2219.  
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ferent than the phone records and bank records collected in Smith and Mil-
ler.109  In other words, cell-site data reveals more personal and intimate in-
formation, and the amount of information cell-site data reveals exceeds the 
single, day-to-day expectancies of society.  Second, the Court underscored 
that individuals do not actually share their location information because “cell 
phones and the services they provide are ‘such a pervasive and insistent part 
of daily life’ that carrying one is indispensable to participation in modern 
society.”110  Because cell phones are considered absolutely necessary, it is 
not realistic to argue that individuals assume the risk that their location in-
formation will be documented, catalogued, and volunteered to third parties 
simply by carrying and using a cell phone in public.111  Carpenter implicitly 
incorporates Justice Marshall’s dissenting opinion, stating that “[i]t is idle to 
speak of ‘assuming’ risks in contexts where, as a practical matter, individuals 
have no realistic alternative.”112  Carpenter similarly pointed out that, 
“[a]part from disconnecting the phone from the network, there is no way to 
avoid leaving behind a trail of location data.”113  In Carpenter’s view, dis-
connecting a cell-phone to avoid cell-phone location tracking is an unreason-
able alternative that could not be expected of society.  Although Miller and 
Smith hold that, under the traditional third-party doctrine, individuals have 
no expectation of privacy in information voluntarily shared with another, 
based on the Court’s ruling in Carpenter, individuals now have a “reduced 
expectation of privacy in information knowingly shared with another,” for 
historical cell-site data, anyway.114  Despite proffering new language that 
 
109. Id. (“There is a world of difference between the limited types of personal information 
addressed in Smith and Miller and the exhaustive chronicle of location information casually col-
lected by wireless carriers today.”).  
110. Id. at 2220 (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014)).  
111. Id. (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979) (“[I]n no meaningful sense 
does the user voluntarily ‘assume[] the risk’ of turning over a comprehensive dossier of his physical 
movements to third parties.”)).  
112. Smith, 442 U.S. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
113. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.  
114. Id. at 2219 (italics added).  
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suggests a revised traditional third-party doctrine, the Supreme Court em-
phasized that its decision does not change the holding in Miller and Smith.115 
IV. THE DICHOTOMY BETWEEN MILLER/SMITH AND CARPENTER IN 
THE DIGITAL WORLD 
“Why is cell site location information more sensitive than bank records, 
which particularly today, when a lot of people don’t use cash much, if at all, 
a bank record will disclose purchases?”116 
A. Traditional Third-Party Doctrine versus Digital Third-Party 
Doctrine 
Prior to Carpenter, the Supreme Court applied the third-party doctrine 
in an all-or-nothing fashion.  By this logic, if the third-party doctrine applied, 
the individual that volunteered information to a third party held no privacy 
interest in that information.117  This means that under Miller and Smith, the 
government can request information from third parties using a subpoena in-
stead of a warrant.118  As explained in Miller and Smith, if an individual 
shares information with a third party, he lacks any reasonable expectation of 
privacy in that information.119  The reason given by the Supreme Court is 
that individuals assume the risk that their information will be divulged to the 
world when shared with third parties.120  Not only do individuals assume that 
risk, but individuals lack a connection to their information shared with a third 
 
115. Id. at 2220 (holding that its decision “do[es] not disturb the application of Smith and 
Miller.”).  
116. Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) 
(No. 16-402) (asked by Justice Alito).  
117. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–44 (1976); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 
735, 743–44 (1979); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335–36 (1973); United States v. White, 
401 U.S. 745, 751–52 (1971) (plurality opinion); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966).  
118. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442; Smith, 442 U.S. at 745–46.  
119. Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 (holding that a bank account holder has no reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in his bank records detailing his financial activity); Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44 
(holding that individuals lack a reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone numbers dialed from 
inside the home). 
120. See, e.g., Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 (concerning financial records); see also Smith, 442 
U.S. at 743–44 (concerning phone records); see also White, 401 U.S. at 751–52 (concerning per-
sonal conversations).  
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party because the individual can “neither [assert] ownership nor possession” 
in the records maintained, stored, and produced by the third party.121 
In the digital world we live in today, Carpenter declined to apply the 
traditional third-party doctrine to historical cell-site location information.122  
If digital data is involved, an individual might have a “reduced expectation 
of privacy in information knowingly shared with another.”123  Unlike Miller 
and Smith, the government must generally obtain a warrant to obtain digital 
data, such as historical cell-site location information, from third parties.124  
Because Carpenter concerned digital data, namely the data generated from 
a cell-phone’s connectivity to cell-site towers, it follows that two separate 
third-party doctrine theories now exist: the (1) traditional third-party doctrine 
governed by Miller and Smith, and the (2) digital third-party doctrine gov-
erned by Carpenter.125 
Before delving into the digital third-party doctrine, it is important to 
understand why the Supreme Court felt it necessary to avoid using the exist-
ing traditional third-party doctrine.  First, cell-site location information is 
qualitatively different than bank statements or phone records.126  In other 
words, cell-site location information has the capability of revealing personal 
and intimate details that could not be compared to the revealing nature of 
bank records or phone records.127  Second, cell-site location information is 
quantitatively different than bank statements or phone records.  That is, cell-
 
121. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2227 (2018) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) 
(citation omitted) (explaining that Miller and Smith limit an individual’s ability to “assert Fourth 
Amendment interests in property to which they lack a ‘requisite connection.’”); Miller, 425 U.S. at 
440; Smith, 442 U.S. at 741.  
122. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216–17 (majority opinion) (“But while the third-party doc-
trine applies to telephone numbers and bank records, it is not clear whether its logic extends to the 
qualitatively different category of cell-site records.”). 
123. Id. at 2219 (italics in original).  
124. Id. at 2221 (“Before compelling a wireless carrier to turn over a subscriber’s CSLI, 
the Government’s obligation is a familiar one—get a warrant.”).  
125. Change to the traditional third-party doctrine comes as no true surprise.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (emphasizing that “it 
may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”).  
126. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2209–10.  
127. Id.  
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site location information paints a much broader and detailed picture about an 
individual than do bank records or phone records.128  One reason for this is 
the sheer volume of location information that cell providers document and 
maintain for years.129  Third, unlike conducting business with a bank or mak-
ing a phone call, individuals do not truly share their cell-site location infor-
mation to third parties.130  The high Court reasons that cell phones are con-
sidered a necessity in the modern age, and carrying a cell phone in public is 
required in order to participate “in modern society.”131  Since individuals 
must possess (and carry) a cell phone, such logic does not extend to individ-
uals having knowledge that their location information is being shared with 
wireless providers.132  Fourth, unlike the affirmative act of dialing numbers 
to make a phone call or swiping a debit card to make a financial transaction, 
individuals do not, themselves, signal cell-site towers and have their cell-site 
location information documented.133  Merely carrying a cell phone in one’s 
pocket is all that is needed to signal a cell tower because whenever a cell 
phone is turned on, it automatically alerts the nearest cell tower.134  This pro-
cess enables the cell phone—and by that, the service provider—to document 
 
128. Id. at 2219 (“In mechanically applying the third-party doctrine to this case, the Gov-
ernment fails to appreciate that there are no comparable limitations on the revealing nature of 
CSLI.”).  
129. Id. at 2210, 2219 (noting that a majority of wireless providers store location infor-
mation for five years).  
130. Id. at 2210, 2219–20.  
131. Id. at 2219–20.  
132. See, e.g., In re United States for an Order Directing Provider of Elec. Commun. Serv. 
To Disclose Recs. to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 317 (3d Cir. 2010) (explaining that “[a] cell phone 
customer has not ‘voluntarily’ shared his location information with a cellular provider in any mean-
ingful way . . . [because] it is unlikely that cell phone customers are aware that their cell phone 
providers collect and store historical location information.”).  
133. See, e.g., State v. Earls, 214 N.J. 564, 577 (N.J. 2013) (noting that “[c]ell phones can 
be tracked when they are used to make a call, send a text message, or connect to the Internet—or 
when they take no action at all, so long as the phone is not turned off.”).  
134. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (explaining that “a cell phone logs a cell-site record by 
dint of its operation, without any affirmative act on the part of the user beyond powering up. Vir-
tually any activity on the phone generates CSLI.”).  
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and improve connectivity of the cell phone.135  As a result, it is the cell phone, 
not the user of the cell phone that takes steps to share location information.136  
For these reasons, Carpenter declined to extend the traditional third-party 
doctrine to cell-site location information.137 
Therefore, the digital third-party doctrine requires assessment of the (1) 
nature of the information and (2) voluntariness.  Assessing the nature of the 
information requires examination of how detailed, comprehensive, and inti-
mate the information is.  Accordingly, both (a) quantitative and (b) qualita-
tive assessments of the information surveilled should be considered.  Second, 
the Supreme Court implies that voluntariness should be assessed two-fold: 
by examining how necessary the device is according to the status quo, then 
considering whether the individual has taken any affirmative act to convey 
information to a third party.138  Thus, when examining voluntariness, both 
the (a) pervasiveness of the device and any (b) affirmative act taken by the 
individual should be assessed.139 
Going forward, courts will invariably engage in an ad-hoc factual in-
quiry when faced with digital data, then decide whether to apply the tradi-
tional rule represented by Miller and Smith, or the digital rule represented by 
Carpenter.140  To what extent does Carpenter’s digital rule apply to other 
means of digital data, like a cell phone’s Internet browsing history, or the 
 
135. Earls, 214 N.J. at 576–79 (discussing the basics of how cell-site location information 
is generated).  
136. See In re Pen Register & Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Auth., 396 F. 
Supp. 2d 747, 750 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (explaining that cell phones search for signal “every seven 
seconds or when the signal strength weakens, regardless of whether a call is placed.”).  
137. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2209, 2216–17 (explaining that “[t]he digital data at issue—
personal location information maintained by a third party—does not fit neatly under existing prec-
edents.”).  
138. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (citation omitted) (explaining that “[i]n the first 
place, cell phones and the service they provide are . . . indispensable to participation to modern 
society.”  And “[s]econd, a cell phone logs a cell-site record by dint of its operation, without any 
affirmative act on the part of the user beyond powering up.”).  
139. Id.  
140. See, e.g., People v. Harris, 945 N.Y.S.2d 505, 507–10 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2012) (holding 
that a Twitter user had no Fourth Amendment standing to challenge a lawful subpoena issued 
against the company for locational information embedded in his posts because he voluntarily shared 
that information with Twitter).  
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location information gathered by navigational apps on a cell phone?141  Even 
more puzzling is that individuals still maintain no expectation of privacy in 
“a lifetime of bank or phone records,” but do maintain some expectation of 
privacy in historical cell-site location information.142  As discussed below, 
the Supreme Court’s skewed valuation of the privacy interests maintained in 
digital data versus bank statements and phone records is mind-boggling.143  
Bank records, credit card records, and phone records are just as qualitatively 
and quantitively comparable with digital data, similar to cell-site location 
information.  Today, as technology even allows for individuals to make pur-
chases “[w]ith just the click of a button”144 on their cellular device, the 
Court’s reasoning in Carpenter overlooks the fact that Miller and Smith are 
implicated in digital data. 
1. Digital Data 
On March 12, 2020, the World Wide Web (“Web”) turns thirty-one.145  
To some, the Web’s birthday is a celebration.  But to others, the Web’s birth-
day is simply a reminder that the Web keeps tabs on its users.  As former 
Google CEO Eric Schmidt put it: “We know where you are.  We know where 
you’ve been.  We can more or less know what you’re thinking about.”146 
 
141. See, e.g., Fourth Amendment & the Internet, supra note 28, at 1006 (questioning “How 
should the Fourth Amendment apply to the Internet? What kinds of online surveillance should the 
Constitution permit? When should the government be allowed to monitor a criminal suspect’s e-
mail, web surfing, or instant messaging?”).  
142. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2267 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“All we know is that historical 
cell-site location information (for seven days, anyway) escapes Smith and Miller’s shorn grasp, 
while a lifetime of bank or phone records does not.”).  
143. See, e.g., id. at 2262, (questioning “Why is someone’s location when using a phone so 
much more sensitive than who he was talking to (Smith) or what financial transactions he engaged 
in (Miller)? I do not know and the Court does not say.”).  
144. Id. at 2218 (majority opinion). 
145. See generally Susannah Fox & Lee Rainie, The Web at 25 in the U.S., PEW RES. CTR. 
(Feb. 27, 2014), https://www.pewinternet.org/2014/02/27/the-web-at-25-in-the-u-s/ 
[https://perma.cc/Q3PU-8ZGE].  
146. Derek Thompson, Google’s CEO: ‘The Laws are Written by Lobbyists,’ THE 
ATLANTIC (Oct. 1, 2010), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2010/10/googles-ceo-
the-laws-are-written-by-lobbyists/63908/ [https://perma.cc/JPC5-YZAT].  
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The use of the Internet has raised, and continues to raise, many privacy 
concerns considering the fact that the majority of Americans use the Inter-
net.147  In the twenty-first century: 73% of adults have used or currently use 
YouTube; 69% of adults have used or currently use Facebook; 37% of adults 
have used or currently use Instagram; 28% of adults have used or currently 
use Pinterest; 27% of adults have used or currently use LinkedIn; 24% of 
adults have used or currently use Snapchat; 22% of adults have used or cur-
rently use Twitter; 20% of adults have used or currently use WhatsApp; and 
11% of adults have used or currently use Reddit.148  Simply put, “[t]he reality 
of today’s world is that social media, whether it be Twitter, Facebook, Pin-
terest, Google+ or any other site, is the way people communicate.”149 
The Internet gave rise to social media, whose devaluation of privacy 
has caused an irreversible outcome.  Search engines like Google and Yahoo, 
for example, routinely gain revenue from selling user information.150  A 
user’s search query can include directions to a mistress’ residence, symptoms 
of a sexually transmitted disease, or the “top 10” dating apps, just to name a 
few.151  Another popular foe is Facebook.  The tech giant recently found itself 
under scrutiny for the way it handled its 50 million users in the wake of 
Cambridge Analytica’s access to the users’ data.152  Still, “[r]oughly two-
thirds of U.S. adults (68%)” reported being Facebook users in 2018, “and 
 
147.  Monica Anderson et al., 10% of Americans Don’t Use the Internet. Who Are They?, 
PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 22, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/04/22/some-ameri-
cans-dont-use-the-internet-who-are-they/ [https://perma.cc/XK5R-H783].  
148. Andrew Perrin & Monica Anderson, Share of U.S. Adults Using Social Media, Includ-
ing Facebook, Is Mostly Unchanged Since 2018, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 10, 2019), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/04/10/share-of-u-s-adults-using-social-media-in-
cluding-facebook-is-mostly-unchanged-since-2018/ [https://perma.cc/7UNY-3X3M].  
149. People v. Harris, 945 N.Y.S.2d 505, 507 n.3 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2012).  
150. See Ira Rubinstein et al., Data Mining and Internet Profiling: Emerging Regulatory 
and Technological Approaches, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 261, 271–72 (2008).  
151. Vivian Adame, Consumers’ Obsession Becoming Retailers’ Possession: The Way that 
Retailers are Benefiting from Consumers’ Presence on Social Media, 53 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 653, 
659–60 (2016).  
152. See Tiffany Hsu & Cecilia Kang, Demands Grow for Facebook To Explain Its Privacy 
Policies, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/26/technology/ftc-face-
book-investigation-cambridge-analytica.html [https://perma.cc/U7JK-3ND4].  
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roughly three-quarters of those users access[ed] Facebook on a daily ba-
sis.”153  Since 2018, the number of Facebook users has virtually remained 
the same.154  In essence, the quantity and quality of information obtained 
from the use of the Internet is alarming,155 but any eagerness of users to dis-
continue using data-intensive applications such as Facebook is not statisti-
cally evident.156 
Today, more Americans either use or own a cell phone than a desktop 
or laptop computer.157  The growing spread of cell phones has arguably sur-
passed any other form of technology.158  Without a cell phone, it is difficult 
to imagine how an individual could effectively participate in modern soci-
ety.159  In fact, at least 95% of Americans own a cell phone,160 resulting in a 
decline of desktop or laptop ownership.161  In the not-too-distant future, the 
 
153. Aaron Smith & Monica Anderson, Social Media Use in 2018, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 
1, 2018), https://www.pewinternet.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/9/2018/02/PI_2018.03.01_Social-
Media_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/DA7S-S7K9].  
154. Perrin & Anderson, supra note 148.  
155. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 395–96 (2014) (“An Internet search and 
browsing history . . . could reveal an individual’s private interests or concerns—perhaps a search 
for certain symptoms of disease, coupled with frequent visits to WebMD.”).  
156. Perrin & Anderson, supra note 148.  
157. Paul Hitlin, Internet, Social Media Use and Device Ownership in U.S. Have Plateaued 
After Years of Growth, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2018/09/28/internet-social-media-use-and-device-ownership-in-u-s-have-plateaued-after-
years-of-growth/ [https://perma.cc/X7GX-885Y].  
158. Michael DeGusta, Are Smart Phones Spreading Faster than Any Technology in Hu-
man History?, MIT TECH. REV. (May 9, 2012), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/427787/are-
smart-phones-spreading-faster-than-any-technology-in-human-history/ [https://perma.cc/C6L9-
BFH8].  
159. Riley, 573 U.S. at 385 (noting that phones have become “such a pervasive and insistent 
part of daily life” that carrying one is indispensable to participation in modern society).  
160. Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (June 12, 2019), https://www.pewinternet.org/fact-
sheet/mobile/ [https://perma.cc/P5GQ-T6RL].  
161. Hitlin, supra note 157.  
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number of cell phone ownership is expected to reach north of 270 million.162  
This is hardly surprising considering that cell phones are much cheaper, eas-
ier to carry, and can be used in more locations than a desktop or laptop com-
puter can be used.163  Cell phones could also be called “minicomputers”164 
because of their limitless capabilities: A cell phone can act as a telephone, 
camera, video player, diary, calendar, television, map, newspaper, video 
game, photo album, stereo, and more.165  Aside from these basic functions—
most of which already equipped into cell phones—a cell phone user also has 
the option of downloading applications, otherwise known as “apps.” 
With the use of apps, digital connectivity has made it possible to per-
haps never have to leave your home.  Tired of being single?  Download a 
dating app.166  Over 15% of U.S. adults have spiced things up digitally.167  
Tired of going to the grocery store?  Amazon has got you covered.168  Need 
to make some extra cash to pay rent?  Apps exist for you to make money 
while lounging on your living room love seat.169  Hungry?  There’s an app 
 
162. Research Peek of the Week: Smartphone Users in the US Expected to Reach Over 270 
Million by 2022, INTERNET INNOVATION ALLIANCE (July 3, 2018), https://internetinnova-
tion.org/general/research-peek-of-the-week-smartphone-users-in-the-us-expected-to-reach-over-
270-million-by-2020/ [https://perma.cc/E3N5-2TMF].  
163. See, e.g., Riley, 573 U.S. at 394–96 (“Even the most basic phones that sell for less than 
$20 might hold photographs, picture messages, text messages, Internet browsing history, a calen-
dar, a thousand-entry phone book, and so on.”).  
164. Id. at 393.  
165. See, e.g., id. (explaining that cell phones can “easily be called cameras, video players, 
rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries, albums, televisions, maps, or newspapers.”). 
166. Mark Jansen, The Best Dating Apps for 2019, DIGITAL TRENDS (Aug. 17, 2019, 12:30 
PM), https://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/best-dating-apps/ [https://perma.cc/4NFZ-CGCT].  
167. Aaron Smith, 15% of American Adults Have Used Online Dating Sites or Mobile Da-
ting Apps, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 11, 2016), https://www.pewinternet.org/2016/02/11/15-percent-of-
american-adults-have-used-online-dating-sites-or-mobile-dating-apps/ [https://perma.cc/JZF2-
GCZJ].  
168. See, e.g., Deborah Weinswig, Online Grocery Set To Boom In 2018 (As Amazon 




169. 17 Great Apps That Will Pay You Money in 2019, THE WORK AT HOME WIFE (Aug. 
25, 2019), https://theworkathomewife.com/apps-will-pay-money/ [https://perma.cc/F6TZ-VK6A].  
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for that too.170  Need alcohol to celebrate a forgotten birthday?  Download 
an app.171  Are you a Cannabis user or supporter?  There’s an app to connect 
you with other Cannabis users or supporters.172  Medical apps also exist to 
monitor and support one’s health, such as assisting recovering alcoholics.173  
Unsurprisingly, the average number of apps Americans use daily is nine, 
while the monthly average is thirty.174 
Is using a navigation app to prevent getting lost worth giving up your 
exact location?  Waze might certainly think so.175  The GPS navigation app, 
purchased by Google for a billion dollars,176 not only has the ability to detect 
automobile accidents and faster routes, but can also detect law enforce-
ment.177  Yet, detecting law enforcement is less surprising than Waze’s abil-
ity to promote local eateries when a vehicle is at a standstill, otherwise 
 
170. See, e.g., Alina Bradford & Gia Liu, The Best Food Delivery Apps of 2019, DIGITAL 
TRENDS (July 30, 2019, 2:37 PM), https://www.digitaltrends.com/home/best-food-delivery-apps/ 
[https://perma.cc/MBC7-6R8D].  
171. See, e.g., Danielle St. Pierre, Never Run Out of Boose Again Thanks to These 7 Alco-
hol-Delivery Apps, BEST (Jan. 2, 2019), https://www.bestproducts.com/eats/g1616/liquor-alcohol-
delivery-apps/ [https://perma.cc/NQY7-9CCN].  
172. See, e.g., The Biggest Cannabis Social Media Community!, PUFFY, 
https://puffyapp.com [https://perma.cc/4VXX-CVDE] (“Puffy App is a mobile platform for users 
to puff, connect, and meet up with new friends.”).  
173. See, e.g., Jessica Timmons, The Best Alcohol Addiction Recovery Apps of 2019, 
HEALTHLINE (Apr. 24, 2019), https://www.healthline.com/health/addiction/top-alcoholism-iph-
one-android-apps#twenty—four-hours-a-day [https://perma.cc/LY7N-3JML].  
174. Sarah Perez, Report: Smartphone Owners Are Using 9 Apps per Day, 30 per Month, 
TECHCRUNCH (May 4, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/05/04/report-smartphone-owners-are-
using-9-apps-per-day-30-per-month/ [https://perma.cc/GZN5-DHNK].  
175. Wazeopedia, WAZE, https://wazeopedia.waze.com/wiki/USA/About 
[https://perma.cc/D6CU-WZNK] (“Waze is a 100% free turn-by-turn GPS navigation application 
that provides real-time traffic updates.”).  
176. Ingrid Lunden, Google Bought Waze For $1.1B, Giving A Social Data Boost To Its 
Mapping Business, TECHCRUNCH (June 11, 2013, 8:37 AM), 
https://techcrunch.com/2013/06/11/its-official-google-buys-waze-giving-a-social-data-boost-to-
its-location-and-mapping-business/ [https://perma.cc/F3Y7-AM7Y].  
177. About Us, WAZE (Sept. 16, 2019), https://www.waze.com/about 
[https://perma.cc/A2TY-CXKV]. 
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known as a “zero-speed takeover.”178  Ever wonder why an ad surfaces your 
Waze screen when you are at a stop sign or stopped in traffic?  This is be-
cause “Google isn’t just monitoring what you do online; it’s watching you 
while you’re in your car, too.”179  For some, navigation is a necessity—and 
to limit being late to work or getting lost, the navigation app has clear bene-
fits.  But to others, GPS-gathered data is alarming because of the wealth of 
personal information that can be revealed, like “trips to the psychiatrist, the 
plastic surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the strip club, 
the criminal defense attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the union meeting, the 
mosque, synagogue or church, the gay bar and on and on.”180  Despite Waze 
having the ability to “ping[] its users’ GPS every second and store[] that data, 
sometimes sharing it with local governments,”181 cell phone users nonethe-
less continue to use the app. 
The bottom line is that using technology has the potential to create a 
permanent digital trail.  This digital trail can reveal both personal and mun-
dane information about one’s identity.  So where does the Fourth Amend-
ment come into play?  Under the traditional third-party doctrine, Miller and 
Smith imply that law enforcement can obtain, for example, DNA information 
from Ancestry.com or 23andMe with a subpoena instead of a warrant sup-
ported by probable cause.182  But under the digital third-party doctrine, the 
only category Carpenter adds protection to is historical cell-site location in-
formation.183  This category excludes Facebook messages, information from 
 
178. Greg Sterling, Waze Conquers ‘Digital Dark Zone’ with in-car, out-of-home ad Co-
ordination, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (Mar. 18, 2019, 10:24 AM), https://searchengine-
land.com/waze-conquers-digital-dark-zone-with-in-car-out-of-home-ad-coordination-314111/ 
[https://perma.cc/EF3W-2BCE].  
179. Monica Burton, Waze is Watching You and It Knows You Want McRibs, EATER (Mar. 
19, 2019, 2:28 PM), https://www.eater.com/2019/3/19/18272694/waze-app-ads-steer-drivers-to-
mcdonalds-mcribs/ [https://perma.cc/32X8-T5C4].  
180. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting 
People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009); see also Michael Mattioli, Article: Auton-
omy in the Age of Autonomous Vehicles, 24 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 277, 293 (2018).  
181. Burton, supra note 179.  
182. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2262–63 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) 
(answering that “Smith and Miller say yes” to law enforcement being able to obtain “DNA from 
23andMe without a warrant or probable cause.”).  
183. See id. at 2221 (majority opinion) (holding that “an order issued under Section 
2703(d) of the Act is not a permissible mechanism for accessing historical cell-site records.”).  
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the Cannabis app, the dating app, bank and phone records, and other digital 
data.  The Supreme Court informs us that only cell-site location information 
is deserving of some expectation of privacy because this information some-
how reveals more personal information about an individual than other 
data.184  It remains unexplained why an individual’s location information is 
more intimate than the troves of bank records or credit card records reveal-
ing, by date and time, a virtual biography of an individual.185 
2. Physical Information Turns Digital 
Today’s Supreme Court discounts the fact that physical data, like a 
debit card or credit card, is comparable to cell-site location information.186  
Concededly, debit cards and credit cards do not ping to nearby cell towers, 
nor do these cards have a tracking chip (to date) that reveals the location 
information of the card.187  However, statements generated by a debit card or 
credit card yield similar to identical information as cell-site location infor-
mation.  First, debit cards and credit cards can produce information with the 
same level of accuracy as cell-site location information.  Second, financial 
statements are far more revealing than the mere vicinity in which a cell phone 
is located.  And third, with the digitalization of bank cards and credit cards, 
law enforcement can learn about the identity of an individual without the 
individual even leaving his or her home. 
The precision of bank records far exceeds that of CSLI.  To illustrate 
this, suppose Jeff visits a shopping center for seven days straight and keeps 
his cell phone on him at all times.  Further suppose that Jeff makes some type 
of purchase at the shopping mall for each day he is there.  He uses his bank-
ing card because he never carries cash on him.  Using only CSLI and banking 
records, which data provides law enforcement with the most actionable in-
 
184. Id. at 2216–17.  
185. See id. at 2262 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (questioning “Why is someone’s location 
when using a phone so much more sensitive than who he was talking to (Smith) or what financial 
transactions he engaged in (Miller)? I do not know and the Court does not say.”).  
186. See id. at 2219 (majority opinion) (“In mechanically applying the third-party doctrine 
to this case, the Government fails to appreciate that there are no comparable limitations on the 
revealing nature of CSLI.”).  
187. See, e.g., Tylene Welch, Can You Track a Debit Card or Credit Card with a Smart 
Chip?, FISCAL TIGER (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.fiscaltiger.com/can-track-debit-card-credit-
card-smart-chip/ [https://perma.cc/B5YV-H8N6].  
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formation?  Beginning with CSLI, obtaining CSLI will provide law enforce-
ment insight as to the vicinity that Jeff was physically located based on his 
cell phone pinging to the cell towers.  This, of course, assumes that a cell 
tower is located near the shopping center.  Intelligent as law enforcement 
officials are, they may be able to deduce that Jeff was at the shopping mall 
each day based on the fact that Jeff—that is, his cell phone—triggered a cell 
site next to the shopping mall each day he was there.  But if law enforcement 
wanted to obtain the cell-site location information for the past seven days, 
they would need to obtain a warrant.188  Carpenter makes that clear.189 
On the other hand, if law enforcement officials obtained Jeff’s banking 
records, to reiterate the late Justice Brennan’s position, the seven-day bank-
ing records would “provide[] a virtual current biography.”190  Jeff’s banking 
records would reveal (1) what Jeff purchased, (2) the specific store Jeff made 
the purchase at, (3) the location of the store Jeff made the purchase at, (4) 
the amount Jeff spent on each purchase, and (5) the date and time of each 
purchase Jeff made.  But unlike CSLI, law enforcement can obtain this in-
formation through compulsory means—i.e., by subpoenaing the bank for 
Jeff’s transaction history for the past seven days.  Taking a step further, while 
banking records can also reveal the flowers or jewelry Jeff purchased for his 
mistress, the $199 handgun suspected of criminal wrongdoing, the adult 
store video, and more, CSLI could not provide that information.  Instead, 
CSLI would only reveal the vicinity of Jeff’s physical whereabouts,191 or the 
vicinity of a cell phone lent to a family member or friend, left in a taxi, or 
stolen.192 
 
188. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 n.3 (“[W]e need not decide whether there is a limited 
period for which the Government may obtain an individual’s historical CSLI free from Fourth 
Amendment scrutiny, and if so, how long that period might be. It is sufficient for our purposes 
today to hold that accessing seven days of CSLI constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.”).  
189. Id. at 2221.  
190. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 451 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
191. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (emphasizing that the cell-site location information 
merely revealed “that Carpenter’s cell phone was in the general vicinity of four of the nine rob-
beries.”).  
192. Although not explored, there may be situations where only one or two stores are near 
a cell tower, and by process of elimination, law enforcement could accurately identify where an 
individual was.  
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Second, while cell-site location information can create a chronological 
timeline of an individual’s past and present,193 “the totality of bank records 
provides a virtual current biography”194 of a person’s past, present, and fu-
ture.  With bank records in hand, the government can learn and deduce highly 
personal details.195  For example, banking records allow the government to: 
(1) catalogue an individual’s expenses and approximate his or her income 
based on deposits; (2) determine where and what an individual eats for break-
fast, lunch, and dinner; (3) determine who an individual’s doctor is and when 
he or she visited the hospital; (4) determine the political preference or porn 
magazine an individual is subscribed to; (5) determine whether an individual 
is a heavy drinker based on frequent trips to the liquor store or bar receipts; 
(6) determine where an individual takes his family or mistress on vacation; 
(7) determine the exact date and time an individual grocery shops at Whole 
Foods; (8) determine whether an individual poorly manages his money; (9) 
determine an individual’s rent amount, cost of utilities, and other household 
expenses; and (10) determine the ATM withdrawal at the sole ATM machine 
inside a brothel. 
With this information, the government can ascertain an individual’s 
habits, hobbies, health, political preference, morals, and much more.  Indeed, 
where bank records and credit card records are distinguished from cell-site 
location information is the fact that the government can study and predict an 
individual’s future conduct.  For example, past financial statements could 
help estimate the cost of next month’s rent, utilities, child support, or even 
which bar the individual will be at next Friday since that individual’s past 
financial statements reveal a trend.  These very few—and realistic—exam-
ples help shed light on the fact that financial statements provide law enforce-
ment with a time machine capable of traveling both in the past and in the 
 
193. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2210 (CSLI “give[s] the Government near perfect surveillance 
and allow it to travel back in time to retrace a person’s whereabouts.”).  
194. Miller, 425 U.S. at 451 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
195. See id.; see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. 
Ct. 2206 (2018) (No. 16-402) (Justice Kennedy reasoned that bank records differ from cell-site 
location information “[p]articularly because the information in the bank records that Justice Alito 
referred to are not publicly known. Your whereabouts are publicly known. People can see you. 
Surveillance officers can follow you. It seems to me that this is much less private than - than the 
case that Justice Alito is discussing.”).  
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future.  And unlike the five-year retention of cell-site location information,196 
a majority of larger banks maintain records for seven years.197 
Third, the digitalization of debit cards and credit cards makes financial 
statements much more revealing in today’s market.  Although credit cards 
and debit cards are physical in form, they can indeed be digitized.  Many 
platforms, including Apple and Samsung, have built into their cellular de-
vices a “digital wallet.”198  Apple in particular has advertised that its “Apple 
Pay” digital tool “is even simpler than using your physical [debit or credit] 
card, and safer too.”199  With the digitalization of debit cards and credit cards, 
law enforcement can learn about an individual as if the individual live-
streamed his activity within his home.200  The same could not be said for cell-
site location information.  Without a cell phone or cell tower, cell-site loca-
tion information is not generated.  Yet, with a cell phone’s ability to store a 
virtual bank, information about the user can be generated while in public and 
in the privacy of the user’s home.  Indeed, virtual banking has made it pos-
sible to conduct business with vendors without having to leave home.201  The 
Supreme Court insists that a cell phone has the capability of revealing the 
“sum of an individual’s private life,” which is far more than what is “tucked 
into a wallet.”202  But to carry a cell phone today is to carry a virtual bank.  
 
196. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218 (emphasizing that a majority of wireless providers store 
location information for five years).  
197. See, e.g., Paperless Statements, CHASE, https://www.chase.com/personal/mobile-
online-banking/login-paperless/paperless-faqs [https://perma.cc/H9QS-BKE2] (explaining that 
“you can securely access up to 7 years of statements online.”). 
198. Mark Edwin Burge, Apple Pay, Bitcoin, and Consumers: The ABCs of Future Public 
Payments Law, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1493, 1523–24 (2016).  
199. Secure, Simple, and Even More Useful, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/apple-pay 
[https://perma.cc/C3CA-PFPW] (describing the usage of Apple’s Wallet app).  
200. See Note, If These Walls Could Talk: The Smart Home And The Fourth Amendment 
Limits of The Third Party Doctrine, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1924, 1933 (2017) (explaining that tech-
nology presents the risk of people “inviting the government into their homes and giving it a front-
row seat to their most intimate conversations.”).  
201. One example is food delivery services like Uber Eats. See, e.g., How Uber Eats Works, 
UBER EATS, https://about.ubereats.com/en/ [https://perma.cc/Z28L-JVJY] (explaining how Uber 
Eats works).  
202. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 394–95 (2014) (“The sum of an individual’s private 
life can be reconstructed through a thousand photographs labeled with dates, locations, and descrip-
tions; the same cannot be said of a photograph or two of loved ones tucked into a wallet.”).  
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To that end, it seems clear that what an individual purchases on his or her 
cell phone is far more revealing than location information.  With the latter, 
law enforcement must infer, based on only having information pin-pointing 
that an individual was in a certain area, that the individual was indeed at the 
particular place.  But with the former, not only can law enforcement obtain 
information concerning the cost and type of item purchased, but also where 
that item was purchased from and delivered to, giving law enforcement the 
full picture. 
B. The Third-Party Doctrine Is “[I]ll [S]uited,”203 Period. 
Carpenter explains that the third-party doctrine is “ill suited to the dig-
ital age.”204  Even if this were true, it was no less true in Miller and Smith.  
Miller and Smith teach us that individuals have no expectation of privacy in 
their banking activity and the phone numbers dialed on a phone.205  Appar-
ently, because these records are “possessed, owned, and controlled” by a 
third party, society has no choice but to assume that the third party may dis-
play the collected information for the world to see, including the world of 
law enforcement.206  But does society truly expect that their finances and 
family calls will be broadcast to the world?207  Surely “no one believes that, 
if they ever did.”208  The majority in Carpenter supports its position by in-
forming us that individuals have no choice but to keep a phone on their per-
sons when in public, leading us to assume that individuals could not possibly 
 
203. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
204. Id.  
205. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–43 (1976) (holding that a bank account 
holder has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his bank records detailing his financial activity); 
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (holding that individuals lack a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in the phone numbers dialed from inside the home).  
206. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2226–27 (2018) (Kennedy, J., dis-
senting).  But see In re United States ex rel. Hist. Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 845 (S.D. 
Tex. 2010) (“[C]onsumers are not forced to sacrifice locational privacy as the price of using cell 
phones.”).  
207. See, e.g., Gerald G. Ashdown, The Fourth Amendment and the “Legitimate Expecta-
tion of Privacy,” 34 VAND. L. REV. 1289, 1315 (1981) (“It would be unreasonable to assume that 
the defendant in Katz would have had less of an expectation of privacy in the numbers he dialed 
from his own private telephone than he did in the content of a conversation in a public telephone 
booth.”).  
208. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2262 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).  
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volunteer their information to third parties based on the necessity of having 
a cell phone.209  But what about the necessity of using banking services?  
Does the fact that individuals constantly share their location information on 
social media platforms affect the Court’s opinion?210 
If having a cell phone is necessary to participate in this day-and-age, it 
is equally as “impossible to participate in the economic life of contemporary 
society without maintaining a bank account,” said Justice Brennan over forty 
years ago.211  Fast-forward forty years, does the Court expect for society to 
maintain a home banking service?212  Rather than store and protect troves of 
financial records that “reveal much about a person’s activities, associations, 
and beliefs,”213 society instead chooses to entrust that information with a 
bank. 
[T]he disclosure by individuals or business firms of their financial 
affairs to a bank is not entirely volitional, since it is impossible to 
participate in the economic life of contemporary society without 
maintaining a bank account. In the course of such dealings, a 
depositor reveals many aspects of his personal affairs, opinions, 
habits and associations.214 
When a burglar enters a home, the burglar’s likely target is the safe 
kept in the basement, not the bedsheets.  Inside the safe can include cash, 
checks, passports, social security cards, birth certificates, personal finance 
records, and more.  But when a burglar enters a bank, the likelihood of the 
burglar requesting cash, financial statements, and all other personal docu-
ments of only John Doe is slim to nil.  The need to use conventional banking 
 
209. Id. at 2220 (majority opinion).  
210. See generally Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Private Eyes, They’re Watching You: Law 
Enforcement’s Monitoring of Social Media, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 997 (2019) (exploring the privacy 
implications of social media use).  
211. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 451 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
212. See Ashdown, supra note 207, at 1313–14. (explaining that “it cannot be said that 
financial disclosures to a bank are truly voluntary, since it is a virtual necessity to maintain a bank 
account in order to participate economically in contemporary society.”).  
213. Miller, 425 U.S. at 453 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
214. Id. at 451.  
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methods is especially true when mom and dad want to keep a separate col-
lege account for their child.  Entrusting hundreds of thousands of dollars to 
a safe accessible by, for example, guessing a pin number, is unnecessarily 
risky.  That risk does not fully escape in the hands of the bank, but the safety 
measures undertaken by a bank adds more comfort than constantly thinking 
about the $200,000 in the home safe.  Using a conventional bank is simply a 
necessity worth acknowledging under the Fourth Amendment’s expectations 
of privacy analysis. 
It bears repeating that the third-party doctrine is “ill suited,”215 period.  
Under the Court’s assessment of the third-party doctrine, since society lacks 
true knowledge that its location information is being received and stored by 
a third party, society does not genuinely volunteer that information to the 
wireless provider as a new customer does to the teller at a bank.216  The Court 
reasons that a cell phone automatically triggers cell towers without much, if 
any, assistance from the carrier of the cell phone.217  But it is the carrier of 
the cell phone that takes the affirmative act of stepping outside their home 
and entering the public.218  But for the user of the cell phone, the cell phone 
presumably would not trigger cell-site towers.219  It would seem that what-
ever affirmative act the Court expects individuals to take must be a reasona-
ble one.  After all, the Court dismissed the option of individuals removing 
the battery from their cell phone before entering the public to avoid leaving 
behind a digital trail.220  Still, it remains unexplained what would happen if 
society learned that its location information is being recorded and maintained 
by wireless providers?  Justice Alito asked this very question:  “[W]hat will 
 
215. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
216. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018).  
217. Id.  
218. See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 429–30 (4th Cir. 2016) (explaining 
that “[w]ith respect to the nature of CSLI, there can be little question that cell phone users ‘convey’ 
CSLI to their service providers. After all, if they do not, then who does?”).  
219. Understandably, the possibility of cell-site towers being placed within close proximity 
to residential areas exists.  This lends support to the Supreme Court’s rationale that society mem-
bers could be within their own home and still generate location information because of their cell 
phone’s close proximity to nearby cell-site towers. 
220. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (explaining that “[a]part from disconnecting the phone 
from the network, there is no way to avoid leaving behind a trail of location data. As a result, in no 
meaningful sense does the user voluntarily ‘assume[ ] the risk’ of turning over a comprehensive 
dossier of his physical movements.”).  
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happen in the future if people – everybody begins to realize that this is – this 
is provided? If you have enough police TV shows where this is shown, then 
everybody will know about it, just like they know about CSI information.”221  
Would individuals still have some expectation of privacy despite having full 
knowledge that their location information is being recorded and stored?222  
Answering Justice Alito’s question only further contradicts the third-party 
doctrine. 
Just as the Supreme Court instructed of the third-party doctrine in Mil-
ler, it should overrule its faulty application.223  Society expects that a privacy 
interest attaches to bank records and phone records.  While the Court protects 
historical cell-site location information that is observable by the naked eye, 
it remains unclear why financial records stored on an app (or at a conven-
tional bank) and hidden from the naked eye are less deserving of Fourth 
Amendment protection.  Adopting a digital third-party doctrine will not re-
solve the tension between the Fourth Amendment and technology, as it is a 
direct departure from traditional expectations and proves unworkable.  What 
will prove workable, however, is adhering to the common understanding that 
what enters the public—either through physical or digital information—re-
mains public knowledge, and that which is public knowledge does not 
amount to a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
  
 
221. Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) 
(No. 16-402).  
222. One solution to potentially resolving the uncertainties of the third-party doctrine is to 
ask whether individuals have consented for third parties to share their information.  Third-Party 
Doctrine, supra note 32, at 588–90 (arguing that “the third-party doctrine is better understood as a 
form of consent rather than as an application of Katz.  Third-party disclosure eliminates privacy 
because the target voluntarily consents to the disclosure, not because the target’s use of a third party 
waives a reasonable expectation of privacy.”).  
223. See generally Daniel Solove, 10 Reasons Why the Fourth Amendment Third Party 
Doctrine Should Be Overruled in Carpenter v. US, TEACHPRIVACY (Nov. 28, 2017), 
https://teachprivacy.com/carpenter-v-us-10-reasons-fourth-amendment-third-party-doctrine-over-
ruled/ [https://perma.cc/7MJ2-J2VU] (explaining that the continued use of the third-party doctrine 
will cause the Fourth Amendment to “become increasingly obsolete.”).  
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V. WHAT ENTERS THE PUBLIC EYE REMAINS PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE: 
“THE SUM OF AN INFINITE NUMBER OF ZERO-VALUE PARTS IS ALSO 
ZERO.”224 
The majority in Carpenter begins its quest to defend against law en-
forcement’s warrantless collection of historical cell-site location information 
by reiterating that, “what [one] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area 
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”225  Carpenter 
furthers its position by underscoring that “[a] person does not surrender all 
Fourth Amendment protection by venturing into the public sphere.”226  At 
the same time, the Supreme Court in Katz emphasized that “[w]hat a person 
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a 
subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”227  For this reason, the reasonable 
expectation of privacy as to the visual observation of a person in public, as 
concluded in Katz v. United States, is zero.228  The reasonable expectation of 
privacy as to a person purchasing adult magazines in an adult bookstore is, 
as concluded in Maryland v. Macon, zero.229  The reasonable expectation of 
privacy as to a person’s movements on the highway is, as concluded in 
Knotts v. United States, zero.230  The reasonable expectation of privacy as to 
the aerial observation of a person’s property is, as concluded in California v. 
Ciraolo and Florida v. Riley, zero.231  In each case, the Supreme Court spoke 
to the privacy interests that attached to areas observable by the “intruding 
 
224. United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 769 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Sentelle, C.J., dissenting) 
(noting that “[t]he reasonable expectation of privacy as to a person’s movements on the highway is 
. . . zero,” and “the sum of an infinite number of zero-value parts is also zero.”).  
225. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–52 
(1967)).  
226. Id.  
227. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.  
228. Id.  
229. Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469 (1985).  
230. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983).  
231. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213–14 (1986); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 
449–50 (1989).  
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eye.” 232  If Katz remains good law, and there is no indication to think other-
wise, then Carpenter’s public location information could not have amounted 
to a reasonable expectation of privacy because Carpenter was publicly ex-
posed to nothing more than “intruding eye[s].”233  Instead of adhering to the 
plain language of Katz, the majority in Carpenter supports its position by 
revisiting two cases it decided over a decade after Katz. 
The first case is United States v. Knotts.234  In Knotts, law enforcement 
placed a radio transmitter inside a container that was sold to the suspect and 
placed inside the vehicle driven by the suspect.235  Law enforcement fol-
lowed the vehicle on public streets and on the highway.236  At some point, 
law enforcement lost visual observation of the moving vehicle containing the 
transmitter.237  But with the aid of a helicopter that picked up the transmit-
ter’s signal, law enforcement found the location of the transmitter inside a 
cabin.238  The Court concluded that “[a] person traveling in an automobile 
on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
movements from one place to another.”239  The Court explained that when 
the suspect traveled on public streets and highways, “he voluntarily con-
veyed to anyone who wanted to look the fact that he was traveling” from one 
destination to another.240  Additionally, despite law enforcement losing vis-
ual surveillance of the vehicle, leaving technology as the only means of dis-
covering the suspect’s final destination, “scientific enhancement of this sort 
raises no constitutional issues which visual surveillance would not also 
 
232. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.  
233. Id.  
234. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276.  
235. Id. at 277–78.  
236. Id. at 281.  
237. Id. at 278.  
238. Id. at 278–79.  
239. Id. at 281.  
240. Id. at 281–82.  
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raise.”241  Law enforcement merely identified what they would have identi-
fied had they not temporarily lost visual contact with the vehicle.242  Accord-
ingly, the Court held that an expectation of privacy did not extend to the 
visual observation of the suspect’s travels in public.243  Left responding to 
the possibility that individuals could be subject to “twenty-four hour surveil-
lance” by law enforcement, the Court noted that “if such dragnet-type law 
enforcement practices” occur, a different ruling may give way.244  Three dec-
ades after Knotts, the Court revisited the possibility of a “dragnet-type” sur-
veillance using GPS tracking devices in United States v. Jones.245 
In United States v. Jones, the Supreme Court similarly considered the 
constitutionality of tracking a vehicle’s public movements with the use of 
technology.246  Unlike the technological use of a beeper concealed in a con-
tainer and sold to the suspect in Knotts, law enforcement in Jones physically 
installed a GPS tracking device underneath the suspect’s vehicle.247  The 
Court found that the installation of the tracking device, for the purpose of 
obtaining information, constituted a trespassory search under the Fourth 
Amendment.248  Although law enforcement violated the Fourth Amendment, 
the majority stressed that it did not violate Jones’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy under existing law.249  This is because the “mere observation” of a 
vehicle traveling in public does not amount to a reasonable expectation of 
 
241. Id. at 285 (noting that the radio transmitter was not used “in any way that would not 
have been visible to the naked eye from outside the cabin.”).  
242. Id. (explaining that “[a] police car following . . . [the suspect] at a distance throughout 
his journey could have observed him leaving the public highway and arriving at the cabin” with the 
transmitter still in the vehicle).  
243. Id. at 281–82.  
244. Id. at 283–84. (citation omitted).  
245. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 408–09 (2012).  
246. Id. at 402.  
247. Id. at 402–03.  
248. Id. at 404.  
249. Id. at 408–09 (noting that “the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been 
added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.”).  
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privacy since that location information is observable by the “public eye.”250  
The concurring justices, however, emphasized that irrespective of “the pres-
ence or absence of a physical intrusion,” a Katz analysis may be warranted.251  
One reason for this additional analysis is that the length of law enforcement 
surveillance could violate the reasonable privacy expectations that individu-
als expect in public.252  Justice Alito expressed that “relatively short-term 
monitoring of a person’s movements on public streets accords with expecta-
tions of privacy that our society has recognized as reasonable,” but goes on 
to say that “the line was surely crossed” when that monitoring continued for 
four weeks.253  On a similar point, Justice Sotomayor questioned whether 
society “expect[s] that their movements will be recorded and aggregated in 
a manner that enables the government” to collect personal information.254  
Justice Sotomayor also expressed concern towards the means of law enforce-
ment surveillance.255  Specifically, the use of technology versus conventional 
surveillance, like physically following a vehicle or viewing footage from a 
nearby camera poll.256  Not only is technology cheaper than conventional 
techniques,257 but when the government employs technology to surveil indi-
viduals, the subject of the surveillance likely does not know he is being mon-
itored.258  The odds of a suspect catching wind of having a tail by an inter-
viewed witness or the distinct unmarked vehicle in the rear-view mirror is 
greater than if law enforcement employed technology. 
 
250. Id. at 411–12 (citation omitted) (explaining that “[t]his Court has to date not deviated 
from the understanding that mere visual observation does not constitute a search.”).  
251. Id. at 414–18 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 422–23 (Alito, J., concurring in judge-
ment).  
252. See, e.g., id. at 409 (majority opinion); id. at 424–25 (Alito, J., concurring in judg-
ment).  
253. Id. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment).  
254. Id. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
255. Id. at 415–16.  
256. Id.  
257. Id. at 429–30 (Alito, concurring in judgment) (explaining that conventional circum-
stances may require “a large team of agents, multiple vehicles, and perhaps aerial surveillance,” 
whereas “monitoring [an individual using technology is] relatively easy and cheap.”).  
258. Id. at 415–16 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
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Writing for the majority in Jones, Justice Scalia recognized the fore-
seeable problems attached to differentiating between long-term and short-
term surveillance: “[I]t remains unexplained why a 4-week investigation is 
‘surely’ too long . . . . What of a 2-day monitoring of a suspected purveyor 
of stolen electronics? Or of a 6-month monitoring of a suspected terror-
ist?”259  The majority in Jones declined to use Katz’ reasonable expectations 
of privacy test, and instead stressed that it would be “particularly vexing” to 
determine that the amount of days, weeks, months, or even years of public 
observation is either too long or short, especially when considering “such 
surveillance is constitutionally permissible.”260 
A. Assessing the Length of Surveillance Cannot Survive Under a 
Practical Application 
It is entirely unclear what the implications would be of a Fourth 
Amendment that protects cumulative data collected by law enforcement.  
The Supreme Court explains that longer periods of police surveillance reveal 
information that, taken together, creates a revealing image of an individual, 
otherwise known as a “mosaic.”261  But this proposition is nothing more than 
“extravagant generalizations,” which the same Court has “never held that 
potential, as opposed to actual, invasions of privacy constitute searches for 
purposes of the Fourth Amendment.”262  By this logic, any length of surveil-
lance by law enforcement could run afoul of the Fourth Amendment based 
solely on the amount of information collected.  The Supreme Court assumes 
that the compilation of information logically amounts to a wealth of private 
information. 
Distinguishing between long-term and short-term surveillances takes 
for granted many things.  The first is that only long-term surveillances reveal 
(1) quantitatively more information and (2) qualitative information.  Even a 
single day of surveillance can reveal more about an individual than a week-
long surveillance, which proves that no amount of days of surveillance auto-
 
259. Id. at 412–13 (majority opinion) (citation omitted).  
260. Id.  
261. See id. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (asking “whether people reasonably expect 
that their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the government to 
ascertain, more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”).  
262. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 n.5 (1986).  
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matically produces a revealing “mosaic.”  Second, police might obtain ac-
tionable information of an individual on day ten of their surveillance, while 
observing little to no information on the first nine days.  Third, the Court 
confuses possibility with certainty.  Surveilling an individual for ten days 
could reveal nothing more than where the individual eats, which hardly 
amounts to a revealing “mosaic” envisioned by the Court.  Fourth, law en-
forcement is not equipped with a crystal ball informing them as to when their 
collection of information implicates the Fourth Amendment.  Fifth, how 
much information actually creates a “mosaic”?  Under the mosaic theory, the 
collection of information would inevitably turn into a Fourth Amendment 
search at some undefined point, making the mosaic theory’s application im-
practicable.263 
A simple example might help bring some of these points to life.  Sup-
pose law enforcement monitored an individual for ten days.  In those ten 
days, law enforcement employs physical surveillance, directing undercover 
officers to follow the individual each time he travels in public.  Of the ten 
days, the individual leaves his residence and enters the public on three sepa-
rate days.  Of the three days the individual was in public, he was alone.  The 
individual went to his local gym, a local restaurant, and a local grocery store.  
Finally, after ten days, law enforcement has uncovered: where the individual 
exercises, including the name of the gym and perhaps the various exercises 
the individual does; where the individual likes to eat, including the name of 
the restaurant and type of food the individual eats; and where the individual 
shops for groceries, including the name of the grocery store and the various 
groceries purchased.  Now to rewind.  Assume now law enforcement conduct 
a three-day surveillance.  The individual leaves his house twice, again alone, 
and enters the public sphere.  On the first day, the individual drives to another 
residence that law enforcement identified as the home of the individual’s 
parents.  The individual picks up his parents and takes them to a local mosque 
to pray.  On the second day, the individual goes shopping at a nearby shop-
ping mall, only this time the individual is with his significant other.  After 
shopping, undercover officers observe three different shopping bags that the 
individual carried: one from Victoria’s Secret; another from Rifles & Am-
munition; and the third bag from Kids-R-Us. 
Between the former and latter suspect, law enforcement undoubtedly 
uncovered more about the latter suspect who was monitored for only three 
days, as opposed to the former suspect who was monitored for ten days.  This 
 
263. Kerr, supra note 68, at 330–33 (explaining the uncertainty created under the mosaic 
theory as to when in the course of a surveillance a search occurs). 
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is but one example demonstrating the impracticability of assessing the length 
of law enforcement surveillance to conclude that a “mosaic” is consequently 
revealed.  The mosaic theory can best be understood as a puzzle piece.  
Tasked with piecing together a disassembled 500-piece puzzle without 
knowing that the puzzle collectively forms the image of a colored black hole, 
it could take days, weeks, or months to uncover that the image is actually of 
a black hole.  But it is the process of individually piecing together the puzzle 
that an individual learns of the shape, color, and measurements of the colored 
black hole.  The collection of this information reveals more about the black 
hole image than does when the individual obtained the dissembled puzzle 
piece.  At the outset, an individual may have deduced that the puzzle includes 
a distinct violet color, but it is through the continuous piecing together that 
the individual collects more information about the black hole, a revealing 
mosaic. 
Returning back to law enforcement surveillance, one problem with the 
Court’s adoption of the “mosaic theory” is that there is simply no practical 
way of measuring how much information becomes too much information, 
and just how long of a surveillance reveals too much information.264  The 
answer, unfortunately, is not located in a dusty textbook or in a Supreme 
Court opinion.  One reason for this absence, perhaps, is because there is no 
clear answer.  How long law enforcement conducts surveillance is not deter-
minative of how much information law enforcement collects.  Likewise, how 
much information law enforcement collects is not determinative of how long 
law enforcement conducts surveillance.  To continue assessing the length of 
surveillance is to contribute to the unworkable mosaic theory that should be 
overruled once and for all.  With the inclusion of the length of government 
surveillance into the Fourth Amendment, law enforcement could run afoul 
of the Fourth Amendment even when they use ordinary investigatory tech-
niques, such as using physical surveillance for a short period of time on in-
dividuals in public, or collecting footage from a nearby camera poll. 
B. Assessing the Length of Surveillance is Incompatible with Katz 
It is unclear how Katz could continue to survive when the length of 
public observation is now factored into the expectations of privacy test.  The 
majority in Carpenter, while incorporating the concurring opinion in Jones, 
emphasized that the length of government surveillance, “regardless whether 
 
264. When Does a Carpenter Search Start—and When Does It Stop?, supra note 72.  
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those movements were disclosed to the public at large,”265 matters in the 
context of what privacy rights society expects to maintain in public.  If phys-
ically surveilling a suspect in public can implicate the Fourth Amendment, 
what is left of the public exposure doctrine?266  A retreat from the public 
exposure doctrine is a direct retreat from Katz itself, for the simple reason 
that Katz already decided the privacy concerns of individuals that inject 
themselves in the public eye.  Short of explicitly mentioning “public expo-
sure doctrine,” the doctrinal rule was implicit in Katz’ expectations of pri-
vacy test.267  What Katz “sought to exclude when he entered the booth was 
not the intruding eye—it was the uninvited ear.”268  Therefore, Katz does not 
protect against the visual observations in public, so “[i]f there is no reasona-
ble expectation of privacy in a specific public movement, how can there be 
any such expectation in a collection of these movements?”269 
With respect to observing what was once public knowledge, as in Car-
penter, Katz’ application does not change.  What once entered the public eye 
remains public knowledge.  The question, then, is whether the public expo-
sure doctrine applies only to contemporaneous observations or to past and 
present observations.  One scholar is convinced that the public exposure doc-
trine is limited to contemporaneous monitoring “at that time” the individual 
was in public.270  Because past movements are not “susceptible to visual sur-
veillance,” law enforcement could not use the public exposure doctrine with 
retroactive force.271  Another scholar insists that the collection of historical 
 
265. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2215 (2018).  
266. Monu Bedi, Social Networks, Government Surveillance, and the Fourth Amendment 
Mosaic Theory, 94 B.U. L.J. 1809, 1843–45 (2014) (expressing uncertainty as to the continued use 
of the public exposure doctrine now that the mosaic theory is applied).  
267. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 769 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Sentelle, C.J., 
dissenting).  
268. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (emphasis added).  
269. Bedi, supra note 266, at 1839–42 (explaining the conceptual difficulties in applying 
the mosaic theory).  
270. Monu Bedi, The Curious Case of Cell Phone Location Data: Fourth Amendment Doc-
trine Mash-Up, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 61, 73 (2015) [hereinafter Cell Phone Location Data & the 
Fourth Amendment] (discussing historical cell-site location information in the context of the third-
party doctrine and public exposure doctrine).  
271. Id. at 73–74.  
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cell-site location information, irrespective of whether the information con-
cerns past movements, is analogous to “obtaining testimony from an eyewit-
ness,” making the collection of public information, available for all to see, 
lawful.272  The scholar adds that historical cell-site location information is 
akin to non-content information necessary to establish communication, and 
because observing non-content information does not implicate the Fourth 
Amendment, neither should historical cell-site location information that does 
not consist of protected content.273  Lower courts have also held that histori-
cal cell-site location information is subject to the public exposure doctrine 
and therefore does not violate the Fourth Amendment.274  Limiting the public 
exposure doctrine to only contemporaneous observations is to say that the 
information conveyed to the public on any given day is forgotten the moment 
an individual exits the public sphere.  Suppose a friend invites you to a barbe-
que.  At the barbeque, another friend approaches you and mentions seeing 
you at Costco last week.  Using this very simple example, Katz teaches us 
that what becomes public knowledge remains public knowledge.  The same 
is true in the digital arena.275  If a drunk tweet is posted onto Twitter, deleting 
the tweet the next morning does not mean the information contained in the 
tweet will not resurface a day, week, month, or even year later. 
The answer to observing historical information, including movements 
that generate cell-site location information, lies at the heart of Katz.  The 
expectations of privacy test was designed to protect that which is deliberately 
concealed from the government, not that which is clearly exposed to the cu-
rious.276  Public visual surveillance should not, and under Katz could not, 
 
272. Brief of Professor Orin S. Kerr at 3–7, as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, 
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (No. 16-402).  
273. Fourth Amendment & the Internet, supra note 28, at 1009–11, 1017–22.  
274. See, e.g., In re United States for an Order Directing Provider of Elec. Commun. Serv. 
To Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 312–13 (3d Cir. 2010).  
275. See, e.g., United States v. Meregildo, 883 F. Supp. 2d 523, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (ex-
plaining that the moment the individual shared information on Facebook, that individual’s “legiti-
mate expectation of privacy ended.”); see, e.g., United States v. Gatson, No. 13–705, 2014 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 173588, at *60 (D.N.J. Dec. 16, 2014) (finding no legitimate expectation of privacy 
in photos shared to Instagram).  
276. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–52 (1967); see also id. at 361 (Harlan, 
J., concurring).  
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implicate the Fourth Amendment.277  The Supreme Court’s continued assess-
ment of the length of law enforcement surveillance is a direct departure from 
the common practice of physical surveillance.278  For this reason, to hold 
otherwise is unprecedented and will prove unworkable. 
C. Using Technology to Obtain What is Publicly Observable is 
Consistent With Katz 
Using technology to obtain what is already public knowledge is per-
missible.  For example, law enforcement routinely obtains information on 
drivers in public by recording their license plate information with mobile 
data terminals that are equipped in most patrol vehicles.279  Since license 
plates are publicly displayed, “[t]hey are there for all the world to see, in-
cluding the world of law enforcement.”280  The Supreme Court has similarly 
spoken on this issue in New York v. Class, where the Court emphasized that 
“[t]he exterior of a car, of course, is thrust into the public eye, and thus to 
examine it does not constitute a “‘search.’”281  Although Class dealt with a 
vehicle identification number rather than a license plate number, lower 
courts insist that Class “applies with equal force to license plates.”282 
 
277. Compare Kerr, supra note 68, at 335 (questioning whether “visual surveillance 
[should] be subject to” the Fourth Amendment), with Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schu-
macher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Em-
pirical Look at “Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 757 
(1993) (advocating that visual surveillance should be subject to the Fourth Amendment).  
278. See David Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, A Shattered Looking Glass: The Pitfalls and 
Potential of the Mosaic Theory of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 14 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 381, 403–05 
(2013) (noting that visual surveillance is “commonplace” and widely accepted).  
279. See, e.g., United States v. Ellison, 462 F.3d 557, 565 n.2 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting 
Darlene Cedrés, Mobile Data Terminals and Random License Plate Checks: The Need for Uniform 
Guidelines and a Reasonable Suspicion Requirement, 23 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 391, 
395–97 (1997) (explaining that “[a] mobile data terminal (‘MDT’) is a ‘remote portable computer’ 
that ‘enables the transmission of data between the MDT and a host computer system,’ allowing the 
police access to a multitude of information about a vehicle and its owner by entering in the vehicle’s 
license-plate number.”)).  
280. State v. Myrick, 282 N.J. Super. 285, 293 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995).  
281. New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 114 (1986) (explaining that “it is unreasonable to 
have an expectation of privacy in an object required by law to be located in a place ordinarily in 
plain view from the exterior of the automobile.”).  
282. See, e.g., Ellison, 462 F.3d at 561 (holding that “an automobile’s Vehicle Identifica-
tion Number, located inside the passenger compartment, but visible from outside the car, does not 
receive Fourth Amendment protection.”); United States v. Walraven, 892 F.2d 972, 974 (10th Cir. 
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The technology used in Carpenter, namely the data gathered and stored 
by wireless providers, “merely captured information” that Carpenter had al-
ready “exposed to the public.”283  Consequently, as the Court explained in 
Knotts, the use of technology merely enhances law enforcement’s ability to 
obtain information that could have been obtained by public observation,284 
and the use of technology to obtain this information does not violate the ex-
pectations of privacy test.285  The same ruling should have applied in Car-
penter.  According to the majority in Carpenter, “the retrospective quality of 
the data here gives police access to a category of information otherwise un-
knowable.”286  But law enforcement obtained information on Carpenter’s 
public whereabouts that was otherwise knowable through traditional inves-
tigatory surveillance methods.  For example, if law enforcement physically 
surveilled Carpenter, law enforcement would have had first-hand knowledge 
of Carpenter’s location in public.  If law enforcement obtained video footage 
of nearby shops, the footage may have revealed Carpenter’s location in pub-
lic.  Had there been camera polls affixed in the surrounding area, and law 
enforcement reviewed them, Carpenter’s location in public could have been 
revealed.  Such options are but a few examples of the many ways that law 
 
1989) (holding that because license plates “are in plain view, no privacy interest exists in license 
plates.”); Olabisiomotosho v. City of Houston, 185 F.3d 521, 529 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that “[a] 
motorist has no privacy interest in her license plate number.”).  
283. See, e.g., People v. Diaz, 213 Cal. App. 4th 743, 757–58 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (finding 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in the historic speed and braking data taken from the vehicle’s 
sensing diagnostic module because “others could observe [the] vehicle’s movements, braking, and 
speed, either directly or through the use of technology such as radar guns or automated cameras,” 
and the “technology merely captured information . . . knowingly exposed to the public[.]”); Mobley 
v. State, 346 Ga. App. 641, 646 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the data obtained by the vehicle’s airbag control module, like the historical data of a vehicle’s 
speed, “because individuals knowingly expose such information to the public. While an outside 
observer cannot ascertain the information regarding the use and functioning of a vehicle with the 
same level of precision as that captured by the ACM, there are outward manifestations of the func-
tioning of some of the vehicle’s systems when a vehicle is operated on public roads. For example, 
a member of the public can observe a vehicle’s approximate speed; observe whether a vehicle’s 
brakes are being employed by seeing the vehicle slow down or stop or the brake lights come on, by 
hearing the sounds of sudden braking; and observe whether the driver is wearing a seatbelt.”).  
284. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (explaining that “[a] police car fol-
lowing [the suspect] at a distance throughout his journey could have observed him.”).  
285. Id. at 282, 285.  
286. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2218 (2018).  
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enforcement could have obtained Carpenter’s location history, thereby mak-
ing his location history knowable.  Simply put, Carpenter’s ruling should 
have read that “technology merely captured information . . . knowingly ex-
posed to the public[.]”287  Whether the information concerned the historical 
data of a vehicle’s speed,288 or the historical cell-site location information, 
the same conclusion would be reached: individuals lack an expectation of 
privacy in their public location information.  As the dissent indicated in 
United States v. Jones,289 “[t]he sum of an infinite number of zero-value parts 
is also zero.”290 
VI. CONCLUSION 
“What is left of the Fourth Amendment?”291  The digital era we live in 
today allows society to work, shop, socialize, and even monitor one’s health 
without having to leave the confines of one’s home.  With physical infor-
mation becoming increasingly digitized, to what extent can the third-party 
doctrine remain viable?  It seems clear that as society becomes increasingly 
dependent on third parties, the more at-risk society is in having their identity 
recorded and stored indefinitely.  While the use of third parties may be nec-
essary to keep up with “modern society,”292 determining the reasonable ex-
pectations of privacy in shared information is best suited under the public 
exposure doctrine. 
The best solution is to get rid of the “ill suited”293 third-party doctrine, 
and instead adhere to Katz’ public exposure doctrine formula.  The lessons 
of Carpenter encourage the active participation with the rest of society be-
yond the four corners of a home.  The Court incentivizes individuals to enter 
the public sphere with some amount of comfort in knowing that law enforce-
ment may have to alter their surveillance practices in order to observe an 
 
287. Diaz, 213 Cal. App. at 757–58.  
288. See Mobley, 346 Ga. App. at 646.  
289. United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 769 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  
290. Id.  
291. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2262 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).  
292. Id. at 2220 (majority opinion).  
293. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
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individual’s journey, for example, to Dodger Stadium.  What enters the pub-
lic, however, is public knowledge.  For that reason, what becomes public 
knowledge remains public knowledge.  This common understanding does 
not change in the eyes of physical information or digital information.  The 
expectation is not that parking in the doctor’s parking lot will be kept from 
any passerby, including law enforcement; it is that the contents of the com-
munication with the doctor will remain private.  No amount of days, weeks, 
or months observing an individual parking at the doctor’s parking lot would 
reveal the intimate contents of the conversation, for it is the contents spoken 
in a manner deliberately withheld from the public that society regards as rea-
sonably shielded from public knowledge.  Because “the sum of an infinite 
number of zero-value parts is”294 zero, the mosaic theory should—and under 
Katz must—be rejected.  Until then, Carpenter will keep law enforcement 
and “judges guessing for years to come.”295 
 
 
294.  Jones, 625 F.3d at 769.  
295. Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1, 34 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Carpenter, 138 
S. Ct. at 2234 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that the majority’s decision will result in 
lower courts “guessing for years to come.”).  
